University of Miami Law School

Institutional Repository
University of Miami Race & Social Justice Law Review

7-1-2012

Title VII Works – That’s Why We Don’t Like It
Chuck Henson

Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umrsjlr
Recommended Citation
Chuck Henson, Title VII Works – That’s Why We Don’t Like It, 2 U. Miami Race & Soc. Just. L. Rev. 41 (2012)
Available at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umrsjlr/vol2/iss1/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Race &
Social Justice Law Review by an authorized administrator of Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact library@law.miami.edu.

Title VII Works – That’s Why We Don’t Like It
CHUCK HENSON*
ABSTRACT ............................................................................................42	
  
INTRODUCTION .....................................................................................42	
  
I. MISUNDERSTANDING TITLE VII’S PURPOSE .....................................48	
  
II. TITLE VII’S REAL PURPOSE .............................................................52	
  
A. BACKGROUND .......................................................................53	
  
1.	
   Influences of Existing Jurisprudence .............................54	
  
2.	
   Civil Rights Era Discrimination .....................................57	
  
B. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY ..........................................................62	
  
1.	
   Kennedy’s Title VII .......................................................62	
  
2.	
   Replacing Kennedy’s Title VII ......................................65	
  
3.	
   Compromising Title VII.................................................72	
  
a.	
   Elimination of an NLRB-style EEOC ......................73	
  
b.	
   Protecting the Labor-Management Complex ............74	
  
c.	
   Protecting an Employer’s Right to Test ....................77	
  
d.	
   No Quotas .................................................................81	
  
e.	
   Placing the Enforcement Burden on the Individual ..82	
  
i.	
   The Failure to Define “Discriminate” .................84	
  
ii.	
   Enforcement of Title VII Rights ..........................87	
  
III. WHY TITLE VII WORKS – UNDERSTANDING MCDONNELL DOUGLAS
.........................................................................................................96	
  
IV. GETTING WHAT WE NEED ...........................................................108	
  
CONCLUSION ......................................................................................114	
  
*

Visiting Professor of Law, University of Missouri School of Law; former Assistant
Attorney General and Assistant General Counsel Missouri Attorney General’s Office;
J.D. Georgetown University Law Center, 1990; B.A. Yale University, 1987. My
appreciation to Professor Rafael Gely, Professor Ben Trachtenberg and Professor S.
David Mitchell for their helpful comments. Thanks also for the research assistance of
Marshall Edelman, Joey Plaggenberg, and Mark Godfrey. Thanks to the Joe E.
Covington Faculty Research Fellowship and the Keith A. Birkes Faculty Research
Fellowship for supporting this endeavor. Finally, thanks to Renee Elaine Henson for
her constant support and Paris Olivia Henson and her Magic 8 Ball.

41

42

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI RACE AND SOCIAL JUSTICE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2

The Supreme Court held that the word “boy” used without
modification was “not always benign” and could be
evidence of racially discriminatory intent.
***
After reviewing the record, we conclude once again that
the use of “boy” by Hatley was not sufficient, either alone
or with other evidence, to provide a basis for a jury
reasonably to find that Tyson’s stated reasons for not
promoting the plaintiffs was racial discrimination.1

ABSTRACT
In response to the universal belief that Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 is not fulfilling its purpose, this Article presents a
different perspective on the reality of this federal employment
discrimination law. Title VII is fulfilling the purpose of the Congress
that created it. The purpose was not the eradication of all
discrimination in employment. The purpose was to balance the
prohibition of the most obvious forms of discrimination with the
preservation of as much employer decision-making latitude as
possible. Moreover, the seminal Supreme Court decision, McDonnell
Douglas v. Green, accurately implemented this balance. This Article
argues that State law provides the best opportunity to seek the
eradication of employment discrimination.

INTRODUCTION
We have chosen to believe that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 (“Title VII”) was meant to end employment discrimination and
have not evaluated the validity of that cognition.2 When I use “we” I

1. Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 190 F. App’x. 924, 926 (11th Cir. 2006).
2. Cognitive dissonance theory was created by social psychologist Leon Festinger
in the mid to late 1950s. See, e.g., Leon Festinger, A Theory of Social Comparison
Processes, 7 HUM. REL. 117 (1954); LEON FESTINGER ET AL., WHEN PROPHECY FAILS
(1956); LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1957). The basic
premise of the theory is that people are driven to achieve consistency and are motivated
to make changes in the wake of inconsistency. To describe this drive, Festinger defined
pieces of knowledge as “cognitions.” “Cognitions” can be abstract or fact based, real or
imagined. It can be a belief even if the belief is a complete illusion. In this article,
“cognition” encompasses all of these meanings. “Dissonance” is the inconsistency
between two or more given variables. “Cognitive dissonance” is the presence of
inconsistent cognitions, which is experienced as uncomfortable tension. The tension
has drive-like properties and must be reduced. The greater the magnitude of the
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mean the scholars, jurists, lawyers, and people who have described or
would describe Title VII’s purpose as the eradication of employment
discrimination. Title VII’s purpose was not the eradication of
employment discrimination. Title VII’s purpose was to preserve as
much as possible of the extant management prerogatives and union
freedoms circa 1964. In preserving the status quo, Title VII necessarily
preserved the beliefs that accompanied those prerogatives. When I use
the words “status quo” I refer to both the scope of decision making
implied by prerogatives and the beliefs, including prejudices,
consistent with the era and with the manner in which those attitudes
informed personnel decisions. The only thing Congress designed this
piece of legislation to do was eliminate the worst forms of overt racial
discrimination.3 Title VII has served that purpose. Title VII works.
That’s why we don’t like it.
The persistence of the belief in Title VII’s broad purposes sets up
an uncomfortable dissonance with knowledge of cases like Ash.
Anthony Ash and his co-plaintiff John Hithon were black employees in
the Tyson Foods chicken processing plant in Gadsden, Alabama.4
Gadsen is about an hour from the city jail in Birmingham, Alabama,
where, in 1963, Martin Luther King wrote in response to critics who
wanted him to delay protest marches. He responded that the time for
waiting was over and supported his response with a list of historical
wrongs including: “. . . when your first name becomes ‘nigger,’ your
middle name becomes ‘boy’ (however old you are) and your last name
becomes ‘John’ . . . .”5 Ash and Hithon were both up for promotion to a
shift supervisor position which the white decision-maker, Thomas
Hatley, gave to a white employee.6 Ash and Hithon brought Title VII

dissonance, the greater the drive to reduce the tension, by reducing the discrepancy
between cognitions. A “discrepant cognition” is one that requires adjustment to reduce
the tension to a tolerable level. Adjustment can be achieved by replacing a discrepant
cognition, adding a new cognition that reduces the tension, and/or supplementing or
changing the discrepant cognition to reduce the tension.
3. See H.R. REP. NO. 88-914, pt. 1, at 18 (1963) (“It is, however, possible and
necessary for the Congress to enact legislation which prohibits and provides the means
of terminating the most serious types of discrimination.”); H.R. REP. NO. 88-914, pt. 2,
at 2 (1963) (“But this bill can and will commit our Nation to the elimination of many
of the worst manifestations of racial prejudice.”).
4. See Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., No. 96–RRA–3257–M, 2004 WL 5138005 (N.D.
Ala. 2004).
5. MARTIN LUTHER KING JR., WHY WE CAN’T WAIT 84 (1964).
6. Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 129 F. App’x. 529, 531 (11th Cir. 2005).
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claims alleging disparate treatment.7 The evidence at the jury trial
focused on their testimony that Hatley had called them both “boy.”8
After the district court granted Tyson Foods’ post–trial motion for
judgment as a matter of law Ash and Hithon appealed.9 Among other
things, the Eleventh Circuit held that “boy” alone evidenced no racial
discrimination.10 After remand from the Supreme Court with specific
instructions to consider “boy” in light of its “context, inflection, tone of

7. Id. Ash and Hithon also alleged analogous claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Id. It
was Hithon’s Section 1981 claim that survived, ultimately successfully. See Ash v.
Tyson Foods, Inc., 664 F.3d 883 (11th Cir. 2011).
8. Ash and Hithon’s odyssey began in 1995 when they applied for the shift
supervisor position at the Gadsden plant. Ash, 129 F. App’x. at 531. In the first trial,
Ash and Hithon won a substantial jury verdict of $250,000.00 in compensatory
damages and $1,500,000.00 in punitive damages each. Ash, 2004 WL 5138005 at *1.
Tyson Foods filed a post-trial motion under F.R.C.P. 50(b) challenging the verdict due
to lack of evidence of pretext. See id. The trial court granted Tyson Food’s Rule 50
motion and dismissed Ash and Hithon’s claims. See id. at *9-10. The Eleventh Circuit
Court sustained the trial court’s decision as to Ash, but not Hithon. See Ash, 129 F.
App’x. at 533-34. On the issue of the significance of the word “boy,” the three judge
panel held: “the use of the word ‘boy’ alone is not evidence of discrimination.”. Id. at
533. The Supreme Court responded that “boy” need not be modified by “black” or
“white” to become evidence of racial discrimination. See Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc.,
546 U. S. 454, 456 (2006). “Boy” standing alone could demonstrate discriminatory
animus. See id. The Court directed the Eleventh Circuit to reflect on the speaker’s
“context, inflection, tone of voice, local custom, and historical usage.” Id. The
Eleventh Circuit’s response is quoted above. See Ash, 190 F. App’x. at 926. The
Eleventh Circuit confirmed the dismissal of Ash’s claims and remanded the case for a
new trial as to Hithon. Id. at 927. Ash and Hithon again sought the Supreme Court’s
intervention, but the Court denied a second writ of certiorari without comment. See
Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc. 549 U.S. 1181 (2007). After a second trial, the jury awarded
Hithon $35,000.00 in back-pay, $300,000.00 for mental anguish damages, and
$1,000,000.00 in punitive damages. See Hithon v. Tyson Foods, No. 96-RRA-3297,
2008 WL 4921515 *1 (N.D. Ala. 2008). Tyson Foods filed a Rule 50(b) based on
insufficient evidence of discrimination, separately challenging the punitive damages
award. See id. The district court granted Tyson Food’s motion as to punitive damages
only. Id. at *10. Both sides appealed. See Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 392 F. App’x. 817
(11th Cir. 2010). The Eleventh Circuit, again, dismissed Hithon’s discrimination claim
for failure to prove pretext. See id at 833. There was a dissent this time. See id. The
basis of Judge Dowd’s dissent was that two juries had found discrimination. Id.
Because two juries of Hithon’s peers had found discrimination, Hithon’s verdict should
stand as to liability. Id. Prior to December 2011, Ash and Hithon had nothing to show
for their fifteen-year investment in this litigation. Hithon’s “successful” claim was
finally affirmed, as to compensatory damages, on December 16, 2011. See Ash v.
Tyson Foods, Inc., 664 F.3d 883 (11th Cir. 2011).
9. See Ash, 129 F. App’x. at 533-34.
10. See id. at 533.
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voice, local custom, and historical usage”,11 the Eleventh Circuit again
concluded that “boy” had no legal significance to Ash and Hithon’s
disparate treatment claims.12
Even if the Eleventh Circuit judges were ignorant of Dr. King’s
letter, ignorance of the significance of a white man calling a black man
“boy” in the middle of Alabama beggars belief. In the Eleventh Circuit,
and probably elsewhere,13 “boy,” without significant additional
evidence, has no meaning under Title VII for purposes of proving
discrimination, despite “local custom and historical usage.”14 If “boy”
now has no real meaning as a historical signifier of discriminatory
animus under the law, how far are other socially significant words from
losing their cultural and legal significance?
Ash could be described as a signpost pointing at the failure of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Over the course of the Ash
litigation Tyson Foods avoided liability in a world where all believe
that Title VII was intended to eradicate discrimination in employment.
Our knowledge, of Title VII’s purpose, our understanding of the
11. Ash, 546 U. S. at 456.
12. See Ash, 190 F. App’x. at 926. Two juries understood that “boy” had a special
meaning according to local custom and historical usage. Those juries demonstrated this
understanding by awarding Hithon more than $1,000,000.00 twice. What makes the
case worthy of attention is that the Eleventh Circuit needed significantly more than the
obvious custom and usage of “boy” in the south to cause them to reconsider their
conclusion that “boy” as used in the case had no legal significance. See Ash, 664 F.3d
at 896-98. The issue remains unresolved how the Eleventh Circuit consciously or
unconsciously determined to ignore local custom and historical usage after specific
direction to do so by the Supreme Court.
13. See Michael Selmi, Why are Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard to
Win?, 61 LA. L. REV. 555, 562 (2001) [hereinafter Hard to Win] (“Race discrimination
claims are generally thought to be the most difficult employment claim to succeed on,
and when it comes to race, the courts’ bias tends toward our common definition of
bias.”).
14. See Ash, 546 U. S. at 456. “Boy” is the polite word for “nigger” in certain
circles. In the middle of Alabama, the connection was so obvious and dangerous that
the defense successfully blocked an attempt by Ash’s counsel to elicit the connection
on the ground that the testimony would be unduly prejudicial. Ash, 664 F.3d at 896 n.
8. The Ash drama is particularly ironic given the reference to Alabama in Dr. King’s
speech:
I have a dream that one day, down in Alabama, with its vicious racists, with its
governor having his lips dripping with the words of interposition and nullification; one
day right there in Alabama, little black boys and black girls will be able to join hands
with little white boys and white girls as sisters and brothers..
MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., I HAVE A DREAM: WRITINGS AND SPEECHES THAT CHANGED
THE WORLD 105 (James Melvin Washington ed., 1992) [hereinafter I HAVE A DREAM]
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history and context of the word “boy” and our cognition of the result in
Ash create a cognitive dissonance. Ash should not be possible if our
first two pieces of knowledge are accurate. To resolve the tension,
however, we do not check the accuracy of the first cognition; we
supplement our information with the cognition that Title VII is not
working. Or, if we admit that Title VII itself is not broken, we justify
our understanding that something is not working by blaming the
Supreme Court for erroneous and illegitimate interpretation. If we are
wrong to believe that Title VII was meant to eradicate employment
discrimination, we are wrong when we say it doesn’t work. If we are
wrong and a statutory basis exists for the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of Title VII in disparate treatment cases, we are wrong to
blame the Court for creating the tension we feel. I think we are wrong.
That we consider cases like Ash as contrary to Title VII’s purpose is a
manifestation of our cognitive dissonance.15 The discrepant cognition is
the belief that Title VII was intended to do more, in its structure or by
interpretation, than prevent gross acts of employment discrimination.16
15. It is the behavior, demonstrated by the use of “boy,” and the belief system, also
demonstrated by the use of “boy,” and the Eleventh Circuit’s approval of that behavior
and belief system that causes the tension when we believe that the point of Title VII is
to prohibit the behavior and, perhaps more importantly, to cause society to jettison the
supporting belief system. What we want is for people, like Thomas Hatley, and
employers, like Tyson Foods, to experience unwanted or negative consequences for
their behavior where they would have no latitude in rejecting the consequences, but
must relieve the tension by changing their attitudes and behavior, including the
acceptance of the responsibility for the impact of their earlier conduct and prejudice.
See JOEL COOPER, COGNITIVE DISSONANCE: FIFTY YEARS OF A CLASSIC THEORY 74-80
(2007).
16. Much scholarship reflects the underlying premise that Title VII should be able
to attack less than obvious discrimination because Title VII was intended to end
discrimination in employment. See, e.g., Natasha Martin, Pretext in Peril, 75 MO L.
REV. 313, 315 (2010) (“Plaintiffs have a hard row to hoe in proving unlawful
discriminatory bias. Without the smoking gun document, the blatant biased statement,
or other direct evidence, plaintiffs must rely on a variety of factual circumstances to
weave a story that convinces the fact-finder that an employer’s actions constitute
unlawful discrimination.”); Ann C. McGinley, Credulous Courts and the Tortured
Trilogy: The Improper Use of Summary Judgment in Title VII and ADEA Cases, 34
B.C. L. REV. 203, 210 (1993) (“In passing Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Congress
stressed that equal employment opportunity is a basic right in this country. The
legislature noted that the other civil rights the Act guaranteed would be meaningless
without the right to ‘gain the economic wherewithal to enjoy or properly utilize
them.’”); Robert Brookins, Hicks, Lies, and Ideology: The Wages of Sin is Now
Exculpation, 28 CREIGHTON L. REV. 939, 940 (1995) (“Title VII molded the basic
moral principle of equal treatment into a national policy to eliminate employment
discrimination.”); Judith Olans Brown et al., Some Thoughts About Social Perception
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This Article presents a new cognition of Title VII. Title VII was
never meant to perform the role of eradicating employment
discrimination in disparate treatment cases. For disparate treatment,
Title VII set a low standard of proscribed behavior that has since been
recognized by the Supreme Court and approved by Congress. The
limited scope of the proscribed behavior sustains an environment
where a court does not recognize a white man calling a black man
“boy” in the middle of Alabama as evidence of discriminatory animus.
Part I of this article describes the illusion we have been socialized to
believe about Title VII’s purposes with the Court playing a significant
leadership role in creating and sustaining the illusion. Part II reveals
the illusion by focusing on Title VII’s original political, legal and
social context and relies on the legislative history to show how
Congress intentionally limited Title VII’s scope. In Part III, the
discussion turns to McDonnell Douglas v. Green,17 because of its
perennial relevance as the Supreme Court’s first and most enduring
interpretation of Title VII in the context of disparate treatment.18 I
argue that a firm statutory basis exists for McDonnell Douglas as an
accurate and legitimate interpretation of Title VII.19 Finally, Part IV
proposes that the alternative to the existing Title VII is not in an appeal
to Congress or the Court.20 The better opportunity for advancing

and Employment Discrimination Law: A Modest Proposal for Reopening the Judicial
Dialogue, 46 EMORY L.J. 1487, 1487-88 (1997) [hereinafter Some Thoughts] (“Most
recently, in 1992, we demonstrated how the federal courts, and particularly the
Supreme Court, had significantly weakened Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
by construing procedural rules in a consistently pro-defendant manner.”).
17. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
18. McDonnell Douglas remains viable even after Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539
U.S. 90 (2003), which was hailed as the death knell of the burden shifting analysis
scholars have found so troubling. See generally Jeffrey A. Van Detta, “Le Roi Est
Mort; Vive Le Roi!”: An Essay on the Quiet Demise of McDonnell Douglas and the
Transformaition of Every Title VII Case After Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa into a
“Mixed-Motives” Case, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 71 (2003).
19. But see, Sandra F. Sperino, Flying Without A Statutory Basis: Why McDonnell
Douglas is not Justified by Any Statutory Construction Methodology, 43 HOUS. L. REV.
743 (2006) (arguing that there is no statutory basis for the Supreme Court’s McDonnell
Douglas interpretation of Title VII).
20. I am not the first to suggest that the Supreme Court and Congress should not be
the sole objects of efforts to actually achieve the elimination of employment
discrimination. In 1997 Professors Brown, Subrin and Baumann decided not to make
“suggestions for further tinkering with the language of Title VII,” but suggested that
judges confront the likelihood of their implicit bias and that juries be instructed on the
pervasiveness of implicit bias. See Some Thoughts, supra note 16, at 1489-91.
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employment discrimination laws which prevent cases like Ash lies in
state law. Individual states offer much better resources for moving
away from a Title VII that works in such unsatisfying ways.

I. MISUNDERSTANDING TITLE VII’S PURPOSE
Describing our knowledge of Title VII’s purposes as a
misunderstanding does not mean that our belief is entirely without
basis21; a rational basis exists for the belief that Title VII’s purpose is
the eradication of discrimination in employment. For example, in
McDonnell Douglas the Supreme Court told us that “Title VII tolerates
no racial discrimination, subtle or otherwise.”22 The strength of the
misunderstanding, like a discrepant cognition, lies in the choice to
accept that statement, and others like it,23 as true, accurate and
correct.24 Ironically, the main source of conflicting information is
21. The argument I am making is that Title VII was meant only to limit the very
worst kinds of discrimination. Therefore, a conception of Title VII as a vehicle for the
eradication of all discrimination or even subtle forms of discrimination is the
discrepant cognition in need of replacement. See id. at 1491 (recognizing the futility of
redrafting Title VII).
22. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973).
23. See, e.g., Alexander v. Gardener-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974)
(“Congress enacted Title VII . . . to assure equality of employment opportunities by
eliminating those practices and devices that discriminate on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.”); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417
(1975) (“[T]he primary objective [of Title VII] was a prophylactic one.”); Johnson v.
Ry. Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 457-58 (1975) (“It creates statutory rights against
invidious discrimination in employment and establishes a comprehensive scheme for
the vindication of those rights.”); McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S.
273, 283 (1976) (“The Act prohibits all racial discrimination in employment, with
exception for any group of particular employees . . . .”); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v.
Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 71(1977) (“The emphasis both in the language and the
legislative history of the statute is on eliminating discrimination in employment . . . .”);
Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 348 (1977) (“The primary
purpose of Title VII was ‘to assure equality of employment opportunities and to
eliminate those discriminatory practices and devices which have fostered racially
stratified job environments to the disadvantage of minority citizens.’”); Oscar Mayer &
Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 756 (1979) (Title VII’s purpose is “the elimination of
discrimination in the workplace”); United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 202
(1979) (“Congress’ primary concern in enacting the prohibition against racial
discrimination in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was with ‘the plight of the
Negro in our economy.’”); Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 228 (1982) (“The
‘primary objective’ of Title VII is to bring employment discrimination to an end . . . .);
EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 77 (1984) (“The dominant purpose of the title, of
course, is to root out discrimination in employment.”).
24. The force of this statement and others like it has cemented this cognition of
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McDonnell Douglas25and its progeny which make proving disparate
treatment almost impossible.26 McDonnell Douglas is internally
dissonant in setting up the cognition of Title VII’s purpose as broadly
remedial and denying that purpose in practice.27 The difficulty in
proving disparate treatment is seen, however, as a problem of
interpretation rather than a fundamental problem with Title VII’s
structure.28 The disparate cognition of Title VII’s purposes is so strong
Title VII to such a degree that it looks more like a behavior than an attitude. In the
drive to relieve the tension caused by cognitive dissonance, attitudes usually change
before behaviors because behaviors are harder to change. See COOPER, supra note 15,
at 2. In dispelling the tension of the dissonance between this cognition, which relates
strongly to the belief about Title VII’s structure and its history as part of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, and the actual outcomes in cases like Ash, which are based on the
Supreme Court’s interpretation of Title VII, we are driven to resolve the tension by
focusing on the Court’s errors in limiting the ability of Title VII to eradicate
discrimination in employment. In short, the belief in Title VII’s purposes is stronger
than the belief in the Court’s ability to properly interpret it. So, the latter belief changes
to accommodate a consistent view of Title VII’s ability to eradicate employment
discrimination, subtle or otherwise.
25. 411 U.S. at 801(“Title VII tolerates no racial discrimination, subtle or
otherwise.”).
26. McDonnell Douglas established the basic framework of the three-part burden
shifting analysis in cases alleging disparate treatment based on circumstantial evidence.
See id. at 802-03. (First, the plaintiff establishes a presumption of discrimination by
showing that he was a qualified, racial minority, who was not hired, and the job
remained unfilled or was filled by someone with the same qualifications, who was not
a racial minority. Second, the employer has to provide a legitimate, non-discriminatory
reason for the adverse employment decision. Third, the presumption of discrimination
disappears and the employee has to prove discrimination by showing that employer’s
reason was just a pretext for discrimination.). An employer need not assert a legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason at all. However, then, it faces the possibility that a plaintiff
will establish a prima facie case of discrimination. See St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks,
509 U. S. 502, 510 (1993). If that risk is unacceptable, an employer need only assert a
reason for the challenged decision, other than the plaintiff’s prescribed characteristic.
Id. At that point, the presumption of discrimination disappears. Id. This evolution of
McDonnell Douglas has been sharply criticized. See The Honorable Timothy M.
Tymkovich, The Problem with Pretext, 85 DENV. U. L. REV. 503, 519-24 (2008).
Aside from the criticism, disparate treatment cases (particularly those claiming racial
discrimination) have been ably demonstrated. See generally Hard to Win, supra note
13, at 562 (“Race and discrimination claims are generally thought to be the most
difficult employment claim to succeed on, and when it comes to race, the courts’ bias
tends toward our common definition of bias.”).
27. See Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination: The Reality of Supreme
Court Rhetoric, 86 GEO. L.J. 279, 324-28 (1997) [hereinafter Supreme Court
Rhetoric].
28. See generally Van Detta, supra note 18; Martin J. Katz, Reclaiming McDonnell
Douglas, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 109 (2007); William R. Corbett, Fixing Employment
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that we do not effectively question the foundation for the knowledge.29
The illusion that Title VII was meant to eradicate employment
discrimination also stems from our attachment to the Civil Rights Era.30
The Civil Rights Era provides the reference point for the beginning of
life in a meritocracy31 focused on the country’s fundamental promise to
give faithful meaning to these words: “We hold these truths to be selfevident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their
Creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these are life,

Discrimination Law, 62 SMU L. REV. 81 (2009).
29. See note 23,supra, discussing the reasons for the strength of the belief that Title
VII is meant to eradicate discrimination in employment.
30. Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry Weingast, The Positive Political Theory of
Legislative History: New Perspectives on the 1964 Civil Rights Act And Its
Interpretation, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1417, 1537 (2003) (“The trouble with [the] heroic
picture is that we may well come away with a distorted view of what actually happened
within Congress between the summers of 1963 and 1964.”).
The strength of the belief in Title VII’s purpose has deep roots in the meaning of the
Civil Rights Era. As a culture, the Civil Rights Era allowed America to be reborn with
the blood of hundreds of years of oppression washed away. It seemed that the Central
American promise of equality became real overnight. President Kennedy addressed the
nation on June 1, 1963, echoing Lincoln’s opening lines to the Gettysburg Address:
that the country was “founded on the principle that all men are created equal . . .” See
infra note 33. Two months later, Martin Luther King, standing literally at Lincoln’s
feet, invoked the foundation principle of the nation. See infra note 31. By passing the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 into law Congress fulfilled the core American promise. Yet,
this epochal event could not have happened without Lincoln, Kennedy and King to
remind the Nation to keep its faith. They are heroes. Their deaths by assassination
made them also martyrs. Culturally, we, the heirs of heroes, have the Civil Right Act of
1964. The purpose of Title VII is informed by our kinship with our heroes and their
gift of civil rights. If we are to retain a cultural sense of American exceptionalism
stemming from our heroic heritage in the civil rights struggle, our inheritance, in this
case Title VII, must also reflect exceptionalism. Charles P. Henry, Long Overdue, 28
(2007). Therefore, Title VII’s purpose could not be anything less than a zero-tolerance
policy for employment discrimination. If, on the other hand, Title VII’s purpose is
limited to preventing or suppressing the worst forms of overt discrimination while
allowing for subtle forms of discrimination based in subjective considerations like
personal animosity, the result is not particularly exceptional and neither are the
achievements of the Civil Rights Era.
31. See I HAVE A DREAM, supra note 14 (“content of their character”); President
John F. Kennedy, Inaugural Address 1961 (Jan. 20, 1961),
http://www.jfklibrary.org/AssetViewer/BqXIEM9F4024ntFl7SVAjA.aspx?gclid=CMi1pLeqxa8CFecSNAod-E7fYg
(“ask what you can do for your country”). This meritocracy consisted of two
interlocking parts: a stress on individual success based on talent and ability, and
colorblindness – color cannot be allowed to make any difference if “all men are created
equal.”
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liberty and the pursuit of happiness.”32 On June 1, 1963, John F.
Kennedy not only reminded Americans that the country was “founded
on the principle that all men are created equal,”33 he told Americans
that he was going to see that the nation fulfilled its promise.34 Dr.
Martin Luther King Jr.’s “I Have a Dream” speech echoed the key
theme of meritocracy.35 By passing the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (the
“Act”) into law Congress finally fulfilled the core American promise to
make meritocracy the American reality.36 For some, President Barack
Hussein Obama’s election in 2008 proves the successful attainment of
meritocracy.37
32. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). The reality of slavery
and the fact that slaves weren’t “men” in a constitutional sense, made it impossible for
America to live up to this promise. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856);
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (counting slaves at 3/5ths of a person); COOPER, supra note
15, at 150. (“The historical inconsistency between the famous phrase in
the Declaration of Independence that ‘All men are created equal’ and the reality of the
Black experience in antebellum America has been replaced by the inconsistency
between the philosophy of equal opportunity and the reality of poverty,
underemployment, and discrimination. In short, to live in twenty-first century America
as a member of a minority group is to experience the double consciousness that
frequently treats one as equal in philosophy and less than equal in practice.”).
33. See President John F. Kennedy, Radio and Television Report to the American
People on Civil Rights, (June 11, 1963), http://www.jfklibrary.org/Research/ReadyReference/JFK-Speeches/Radio-and-Television-Report-to-the-American-People-onCivil-Rights-June-11-1963.aspx [hereinafter Report on Civil Rights].
34. See id. (“Now the time has come for the Nation to fulfill its promise. * * * Next
week I shall ask the Congress of the United States to act, to make a commitment it has
not fully made in this century to the proposition that race has no place in American life
or law. * * * I am, therefore, asking the Congress to enact legislation giving all
Americans the right to be served in facilities which are open to the public. . . . I am also
asking Congress to authorize the Federal Government to participate more fully in
lawsuits designed to end segregation in public education. * * * Other features will also
be requested, including greater protection for the right to vote.”).
35. On August 28, 1963, standing literally at Lincoln’s feet, King told his listeners,
including Kennedy,
In a sense we have come to our nation’s capital to cash a check. When the architects of
our republic wrote the magnificent words of the Constitution and the Declaration of
Independence, they were signing a promissory note to which every American was to
fall heir. This note was a promise that all men, yes, black men as well as white men,
would be guaranteed the unalienable rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.
I HAVE A DREAM, supra note 14, at 102.
36. See Brookins, supra note 16, at 940.
37. See, e.g., WILLIAM JELANI COBB, THE SUBSTANCE OF HOPE: BARACK OBAMA
AND THE PARADOX OF PROGRESS (2010); JABARI ASIM, WHAT OBAMA MEANS…FOR
OUR CULTURE, OUR POLITICS, OUR FUTURE 218 (2009) (“The remnants of old-school
racism that reared up in certain quarters prior to election day were not revealed as
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The Supreme Court has been instrumental in confirming the
disparate cognition of Title VII’s purpose.38 The Court has found “that
Congress’ primary purpose was the prophylactic one of achieving
equality of employment ‘opportunities’ and removing ‘barriers’ to such
equality.”39 A more emotionally satisfying version of the same idea is
the pronouncement that Title VII is part of “a complex legislative
design directed at a historic evil of national proportions.”40 These
statements have no textual foundation in Title VII. Earlier versions of
what became Title VII possessed a congressional declaration of
purpose: “that it is the national policy to protect the right of the
individual to be free from [employment] discrimination.”41 This
specific declaration of purpose did not survive as part of Title VII.42 A
more detailed look at Title VII’s legislative history provides significant
information for assessing a change in our beliefs regarding its purpose.

II. TITLE VII’S REAL PURPOSE
The words “Title VII’s purpose is to eradicate employment

omens of a November surprise but exposed as the last gasps of a dying pathology.”).
At least in his speeches, particularly his inaugural address, the President also gives the
impression that his election was a culmination. Theme of the inauguration, “A new
birth of freedom,” from Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address links President Obama to the
foundation promise of the nation, the breach of which Lincoln lamented and the
fulfillment of which President Obama celebrated. The President specifically remarks
on the completion of the Civil Rights effort:
What is required of us now is a new era of responsibility . . . This is
the meaning of our liberty and our creed – why men and women and
children of every race and every faith can join in celebration across
this magnificent Mall, and why a man whose father less than sixty
years ago might not have been served at a local restaurant can stand
before you and take a most sacred oath.
President Barack Obama, Inaugural Address 13 (Jan. 20, 2009),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/inaugural-address/.
38. See note 23 supra and cases cited therein.
39. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U. S. 440, 449 (1982).
40. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S. 405, 416 (1975).
41. See H.R. REP. NO. 88-914, pt. 1, at 18 (1963).
42. This declaration of policy was Section 701(a) of what would become Title VII
until the omnibus civil rights bill left the House for the Senate in late 1963. Senator
Dirksen’s amendments deleted this statement of purpose. See Rodriguez & Weingast,
supra note 30, at 1493 (“To the extent that Dirksen rationally feared that the broad
phrasing of Section 701(a) would authorize courts to expand the scope of the Act, his
intent in deleting it seems rather prescient.”). See also Part II.B. infra, describing Title
VII’s legislative history.

2012]

TITLE VII WORKS – THAT’S WHY WE DON’T LIKE IT

53

discrimination” do not appear in its text.43 Nor does the statement: “In
the implementation of [personnel decisions], it is abundantly clear that
Title VII tolerates no racial discrimination, subtle or otherwise.”44 It is
wrong to expect to see those words in Title VII. Title VII was, after all,
a quid pro quo for the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964;45 the
compromise was to limit Title VII’s reach and preserve the status
quo.46 This included: entirely prospective legislation; the commitment
to retain as much of existing management prerogatives in personnel
decisions as possible; and a focus only on overt gross acts of
discrimination. Proponents of the status quo co-opted meritocracy to
move this agenda into Title VII.

A. Background
An accurate understanding of Title VII’s real purposes must focus
on its legal, social and political contexts. This combination of contexts
chiefly describes the thinking of the politicians in intentionally limiting
43. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 has no preamble stating its purpose, nor do any of
its component Titles. A statement of the purpose and content of the legislation that
would become the Act comes from House Report 88-914, November 20, 1963 on
House Resolution 7152. According to the report, “The bill, as amended, is designed
primarily to protect and provide more effective means to enforce the civil rights of
persons within the jurisdiction of the Unites States.” H.R. REP. NO. 88-914, pt. 1, at 16
(1963). The General Statement to the report describes that H.R. 7152
[i]s designed as a step toward eradicating significant areas of discrimination on
a nationwide basis. It is general in application and national in scope. No
bill can or should lay claim to eliminating all of the causes and
consequences of racial or other types of discrimination against
minorities. There is reason to believe, however, that national leadership
provided by the enactment of Federal legislation dealing with the most
troublesome problems will create an atmosphere conducive to voluntary
or local resolution of other forms of discrimination. It is, however,
possible and necessary for the Congress to enact legislation which
provides the means of terminating the most serious types of
discrimination. This H.R. 7152, as amended, would achieve in a number
of related areas. * * * It would eliminate discrimination in employment.
...
Id. at 18. The report’s section-by-section analysis of Title VII states: “The
purpose of this tile is to eliminate, through the utilization of formal and
informal remedial procedures, discrimination in employment based on
race, color, religion or national origin.” Id. at 26.
44. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973).
45. CHARLES & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 37 (1985) [hereinafter WHALENS].
46. See infra note 153 and accompanying text.
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Title VII to the immediate issues at hand and simultaneously
preventing Title VII, with the Court’s assistance, from eradicating all
but the most overt forms of employment discrimination.
In 1963 and 1964, Civil Rights legislation and the idea of a
federal fair employment practices law was not new.47 There was a
critical mass of state laws seemingly aimed at employment
discrimination.48 A related and very powerful body of federal law also
existed in the field of labor relations.49 The nation also recently adopted
meritocracy as its goal.50 Moreover, a tension existed between federal
labor law and the employment at will doctrine developed under the
state law. That tension must be given credit for the role it played in
guiding Congressional intentions in drafting Title VII’s text.51 Finally,
if we look at the kind of discrimination it took to fully animate the
national debate over civil rights,52 we should better understand the
nature of the discrimination Congress ultimately prohibited under Title
VII.

1. Influences of Existing Jurisprudence
A serious question for the legislators working for and against
civil rights was the nature of the change in scope of existing
management prerogatives in the private sector.53 Historically,
47. See generally Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-315, 71 Stat. 634
(1957); Civil Rights Act of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-449, 74 Stat. 86 (1960). As to
employment discrimination, the bills that fathered Title VII were H.R. 10144 “Federal
Equal Employment Opportunity Act” in 1963 and H.R. 405 “Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1963.” See also Francis J. Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7
B.C. L. REV. 431 (1966) (“In the legislative branch of the federal government, this
history of FEP legislation prior to 1964 was characterized by repeated failures for civil
rights advocates.”) (giving a brief chronicle of these failures starting in 1941).
48. H.R. REP. NO. 88-570, at 2302 (1963) (“Testimony before the committee has
indicated that Federal legislation is necessary despite the existence of fair employment
practice laws in almost half the States.”).
49. See National Labor Relations Act, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (current version at 29
U.S.C. §§ 151-168).
50. See supra Part I.
51. See infra Part II.A.1.
52. See infra Part II.A.2. Professor Selmi has observed that the Supreme Court
cannot see anything, but the kind of discrimination that brought on the Civil Rights Act
of 1964. See Supreme Court Rhetoric, supra note 27, at 284, 335 (“Once the signs
denominating ‘colored’ and ‘white’ facilities were taken down, it has been difficult for
the Court to understand what legal problem remained.”).
53. See Richard A. Bales, Explaining the Spread of At-Will Employment as an
Interjurisdictional Race to the Bottom of Employment Standards, 75 TENN. L. REV.
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management prerogatives found expression in the at will employment
doctrine.54 Under that doctrine an employer could take any personnel
action for any or no reason.55 Clearly, refusing jobs or promotions to
blacks fell squarely within management prerogatives.56 Such decisions
also found ample support in the reigning social mores.57
It was not until the New Deal Era that federal law made any
significant inroads into at-will employment. One of the favored
children of the New Deal, the National Labor Relations Act, curbed
management prerogatives, but only in a very limited way.58 It became a
national policy, enforced directly by a federal agency, the National
Labor Relations Board, to prevent the exercise of the full scope of
management prerogatives, but only to the degree that the right to deny
or terminate employment no longer included union activity as a
reason.59
The existence of a federal mandate for a federal agency to
prosecute unlawful discrimination gave the right being protected
enhanced status. Once an employee filed an unfair labor practice
charge with the NLRB, the NLRA transfigured that individual’s private
right to a public right.60 The actions of the NLRB after receipt of the
453, 458 (2008); Jay M. Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule,
20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 118, 126 (1976).
54. See Deborah L. Markowitz, The Demise of At-Will Employment and the Public
Employee Conundrum, 27 URB. LAW. 305, 308 (1995).
55. See Bales, supra note 53, at 461 (describing at-will employment as a “doctrine
whereby an employer has nearly absolute control over employment terms.”).
56. See id. Since race would fall under the heading of “any” reason and there was
no protection for racial discrimination under the NLRA until 1964, and no effective
protection under state fair employment practices laws, any employer could use race as
a reason for an adverse employment decision.
57. See C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW, 149-88 (3d ed.
1974); Ralph K. Winter, Jr., Improving the Economic Status of Negros Through Laws
Against Discrimination: A Reply to Professor Sovern, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 817, 818
(1967) (“Questions of style and beauty as well as other even less easily identified
considerations constantly shape business (and employment) decisions. Matters of
individual taste are involved and cannot be eliminated without gross impingement on
individual freedom and quite intolerable substantive results.”).
58. See Markowitz, supra note 54, at 309-10; Robert J. Affeldt, Title VII in the
Federal Courts – Private or Public Law: Part I, 14 VILL. L. REV. 664, 666-67 (1969)
[hereinafter Affeldt Part I].
59. See National Labor Relations Act, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (current version at 29
U.S.C. §§ 151-168).
60. At least that was the perspective of commentators in the aftermath of the
passage of the Civil Right Act of 1964, who compared the Title VII with the NLRA
and concluded that the rights under Title VII compared to those under the NLRA were
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charge vindicated the public policy of the NLRA: empowering
individuals to engage in collective action to balance the power of
management at the bargaining table as the best way to achieve lasting
industrial harmony.61
If Title VII were to mirror the NLRA, the right to be free from
discrimination in employment because of race, color, religion, national
origin or sex would identify discrimination under Title VII as harm to
the individual and society as a whole.62 The less Title VII resembles the
NLRA, particularly as to the existence of a federal agency tasked with
enforcement, the less employment discrimination resembles a public
wrong.63 Wrongs under Title VII would then be private rather than
public, and “not so injurious to the community to justify the
intervention of the public law enforcement authorities.”64
Employment discrimination, as something not cognizable as a
national public wrong necessarily implicates federalism.65 Indeed, a
not public. See Affeldt Part I, supra note 58, at 672-78 (arguing why discrimination is
a “public wrong”); Stuart A. Morse, Comment, The Scope of Judicial Relief Under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 46 TEX. L. REV. 516, 520 (1968) [hereinafter
Morse] (had it retained its NLRB-like powers, the EEOC “would not have adjudicated
private rights, but would have acted in the public interest to obtain broad compliance . .
. .”); Comment, Enforcement of Fair Employment Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
32 U. CHI. L. REV. 430, 432 (1965) [hereinafter Enforcement of Fair Employment]
(“As originally conceived, Title VII would primarily have established a ‘public’ right
and only incidentally created a private one. Like the NLRA, Title VII was to have been
enforced by a federal agency empowered to eliminate discriminatory practices by
issuing cease-and-desist orders.”).
61. National Labor Relations Act, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (current version at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 151-168).
62. See Richard K. Berg, Equal Employment Opportunity Under The Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 31 BROOK. L. REV. 62, 67 (1964).
63. See Morse, supra note 60, at 520.
64. Berg, supra note 62, at 67. See also, Article, Title VII, Civil Rights Act of 1964:
Present Operation and Proposals for Improvement, 5 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 1, 7
(1969) [hereinafter Present Operation] (Title VII, by making enforcement a private
action with private remedies, “[creates] a private right.”); Affeldt Part I, supra note 58,
at 672 (“if the courts view the charging party’s suit as a private suit, with no public
interest, the Title is again doomed.”); Enforcement of Fair Employment, supra note 60,
at 432.
65. The NLRA, as an expression of national policy preempts state law under
Section 301; WILLIAM H. RIKER, FEDERALISM: ORIGIN, OPERATION, SIGNIFICANCE 155
(1964) (“If in the United States one disapproves of racism, one should disapprove of
federalism.”). Professor Riker concluded that the main, although not sole, beneficiaries
of American Federalism were Southern Whites. The normative question on the value
of American federalism for Professor Riker was “a judgment on the values of
segregation and racial oppression.” Id. at 153. I am indebted to Professor Charlton C.
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critical mass of states had employment discrimination laws in the
period immediately preceding the passage of the Civil Rights Act.66
The issue of employment discrimination remained a problem in almost
all of these states.67 If federalism suborns racism,68 then one would
have to conclude that any federal employment discrimination law
would be doomed to failure if it relied on the states for investigation
and enforcement.69 From that perspective, the nature of any balance
struck that limited central authority in favor of local autonomy would
speak volumes about the value of the rights protected under Title VII
vis-a-vis existing management prerogatives under the at-will
employment doctrine.

2. Civil Rights Era Discrimination70
The meaning of “discrimination” in the Civil Rights Era is
obviously not susceptible of definition with one hundred percent
accuracy. Never-the-less, one thing Congress’ failure to define
“discrimination” suggests is that there was a common understanding of
the word, which taken together with the practices that Congress
determined would and would not be unlawful under Title VII, gives a

Copeland of the University of Miami School of Law for causing me to consider the
impact of federalism on segregation in American society, generally, and how America
handles discrimination in employment specifically. Issues of federalism arose during
the debate over Title VII in Congress and ultimately caused the EEOC to have to take a
back seat to state fair employment practices entities. H.R. Rep. No. 87-1370, at 5, 8;
H.R. Rep. No. 88-570, at 16, 19; 110 Cong. Rec. 12721, 12723, 14327, 14329, 14331.
66. Berg, supra note 62, at 67 n. 10.
67. In those states with fair employment practice laws, the House Committee on
Education and Labor considered these problems twofold: “Second, State [sic] laws
very [sic] in coverage and effectiveness. Third, State [sic] commissions have
encountered difficulty in dealing with large, multiphased operations of business in
interstate commerce.” H.R. REP. NO. 88-570, at 2302-03 (1963); see also Present
Operation, supra note 64, at 12-13 (“State fair employment practices laws have been
largely ineffective due to lax enforcement and the paucity of complaints. The low level
of complaints has been attributed to apathy, fear and distrust of state fair employment
practices commissions.”).
68. See RIKER, supra note 65, at 155.
69. See supra note 64.
70. I am purposefully excluding from this discussion “discrimination” as used and
understood under the federal labor law. Discrimination under that law was linked to the
exercise of a legal right granted by the federal government. It has a distinctly different
flavor from decisions based solely on readily identifiable characteristics, like race or
skin color, which requires the holder of that characteristic to do nothing more than
exist.
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very good picture of the nature of the discrimination in employment
that Congress proscribed.71 The common understanding of actions that
amounted to “discrimination” and Title VII’s text supply a definition
that does not encompass much more than a personnel decision that
obtained almost solely because an individual was black.
A common understanding of “discrimination” in the Civil Rights
Era should capture both the most dramatic influences on the changes in
the American conscience that made meritocracy/colorblindness a key
feature of the Era and the more nuanced behaviors of the people
involved in the passage of the Act.72 There are many events of the Civil
Rights era that riveted the public’s attention on the “Negro Problem.”73
A non-exhaustive list of the highlights includes the trial for the murder
of Emmitt Till in Money, Mississippi, the integration of Central High
School in Little Rock, Arkansas, the Montgomery, Alabama bus
boycott, and the events in Birmingham, Alabama that catalyzed the
Kennedy administration to submit omnibus civil rights legislation to
Congress.74 These events served to publicize the level of violence and
71. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as
Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 341 (1990) (discussing alternative
meanings for “discrimination” in Title VII in their critique of textualism as a valid
foundation principle for statutory interpretation). As discussed in Part II.B.2. however,
Congress was aware of definitions of discrimination put forth by witnesses testifying
on behalf of H.R. 405, the sire of Title VII. These proposed definitions linked
discrimination to any reliance on subjective criteria for personnel decisions. The fact
that these definitions did not appear in Title VII suggests an intention to allow
subjectivity to continue to play the role it had always played, so long as race was not
the only reason for an adverse employment decision.
72. C. Vann Woodward’s insights on segregation give an idea of the nuances when
he describes segregation as a physical distance, rather than a social distance: “physical
separation of people for reasons of race. Its opposite is not necessarily ‘integration’ . . .
nor ‘equality.’” WOODWARD, supra note 57, at xi-xii.
73. These events have been chronicled in such works as TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING
THE WATERS: AMERICA AND THE KING YEARS 1954-1963 (1988); DAVID J. GARROW,
BEARING THE CROSS: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. AND THE SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN
LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE, (First Vintage Books ed. 1988); HARVARD SITKOFF, THE
STRUGGLE FOR BLACK EQUALITY 1964-1992 (rev. ed. 1993).
74. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note at 71, at 342-43 (discussing the influence of
context on meaning). Although I agree with Professors Eskridge and Frickey that these
kinds of images should inform our understanding of discrimination circa 1964, I think
they inform only a general understanding and not one that translates, without more, to
Title VII. Kennedy’s address to the Nation and his civil rights legislation said nothing
about equal employment opportunities for blacks in the public sector. Even after the
famous March on Washington For Jobs and Freedom, where Dr. King delivered the “I
Have a Dream” speech, Kennedy dismissed the notion of a strong equal employment
opportunity law as antithetical to the purpose of passing omnibus civil rights
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animosity directed at blacks solely because they were black. This
elevated the issue of making decisions or taking actions based on race
or color to a national moral question.75
On a less graphic level, the problem of discrimination was also
largely understood as a physical reaction to skin color alone. This was
true in organized labor.76 In other parts of society the issue was
described as having to associate with blacks,77 work alongside blacks,78
live in the same neighborhood as blacks79 or serve blacks80 because
they were black. “Discrimination” can, therefore, be understood as
equal to segregation. This meaning of “discrimination” has two
overlapping aspects. First, it captures the enforced de facto or de jure

legislation. WHALENS, supra note 45, at 26-27.
75. See I HAVE A DREAM, supra note 14, at 102 (“In a sense we have come to our
nation’s capital to cash a check. When the architects of our republic wrote the
magnificent words of the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence, they were
signing a promissory note to which every American was to fall heir. This note was a
promise that all men, yes, black men as well as white men, would be guaranteed the
unalienable rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.”); Report on Civil
Rights, supra note 33 (“This Nation was founded by men of many nations and
backgrounds. It was founded on the principle that all men are created equal, and that
the rights of every man are diminished when the rights of one man are threatened. * * *
We are confronted primarily with a moral issue. It is as old as the scriptures and is as
clear as the American Constitution.”). The immediate forefather of Title VII, H.R. 405,
would have contained a finding that “discrimination in employment . . . is contrary to
American principles of liberty and equality of opportunity, is incompatible with the
Constitution . . . .” See H.R. REP. NO. 88-570, at 2305-06 (1963).
76. See, e.g., Tunstall v. Bhd. of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 323 U.S. 210
(1944); Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944); Michael A.
Sovern, The National Labor Relations Act and Racial Discrimination, 62 COLUM. L.
REV. 563, 565 (1962) (“Indeed in some sectors of the economy unions have more to
say about who gets jobs than employers do. And those exercising this power have not
always been color-blind. It is not merely that some unions have refused, either
explicitly or tacitly, to admit Negroes to membership and that others have relegated
them to segregated locals. These are not insignificant handicaps and affronts, but they
are obviously secondary in importance to the use of union power to confine Negroes to
the lowest job classifications of some enterprises and to exclude them from others all
together.”) (citations omitted); H.R. REP. NO. 88-570, at 2301 (1963) (Discrimination
by labor organizations, particularly certain construction unions, with respect to
membership and training is widespread.”).
77. See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964); Harvey M. Applebaum,
Miscegenation Statutes: A Constitutional and Social Problem, 53 GEO. L.J. 49 (1964).
78. See H.R. REP. NO. 88-570, at 2301 (1963) (“Segregated locals still exist despite
continuous statements of opposition by national labor leaders.”).
79. See Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948).
80. See Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
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physical separation of people.81 Picture two drinking fountains one for
“white” one for “colored.” Second, it captures the contemporary action
of relegating people to positions commensurate with preconceived and
constantly reinforced beliefs as to limitations on their abilities based on
skin color alone.82 In the end, despite the fact that there was no means
to start a discussion of what it meant to use words like “nigger” or
“boy,” there was a common understanding that discrimination was at
least an intentional adverse response to race alone.83
Turning to Title VII, the language suggests that Congress was
addressing by permission or prohibition personnel decisions related to
skin color alone rather than some more subtle form of discrimination.84
81. See WOODWARD, supra note 57, at xi.
82. Reporting on Title VII’s forerunner, H.R. 405, the Committee on Education and
Labor seemed to view even “subtle” forms of discrimination as segregating behavior; a
physical action. See H.R. REP. NO. 88-570, at 2301 (1963) (“Job discrimination most is
extant in almost every area of employment and in every area of the country. It ranges
patent absolute rejection to more subtle forms of invidious distinctions. Most
frequently, it manifests itself through relegation to ‘traditional’ positions and through
discriminatory promotional practices.”). The recognition of “discrimination” as a
function of skin color did not include what we now call expressions of bias. Nigger, for
example, was not a strange word to Supreme Court Justice James Clark McReynolds,
or Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, or Johnson. See, e.g., RANDALL KENNEDY, NIGGER:
THE STRANGE CAREER OF A TROUBLESOME WORD 9-10 (Vintage Books ed. 2003).
Truman desegregated the American military; establishing the President’s Committee
on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services. See Exec. Order No.
9,981, 13 Fed. Reg. 4313 (July 28, 1948). Eisenhower deployed the 101st Airborne
Division to make sure that the Little Rock Nine got to Central High School, Providing
Assistance for the Removal of an Obstruction of Justice within the State of Arkansas,
Proclamation No. 3204, 22 Fed. Reg. 7628 (Sept. 25, 1957). And Johnson actually
made the Civil Rights Act of 1964 happen. One might conclude that, at least from their
perspectives, using a word like “nigger” did not make them racists or their actions
discriminatory.
83. See Berg, supra note 62, at 71. Mr. Berg’s often-referenced description of Title
VII’s legislative history provides significant insight to the contemporary and welldisposed legal mind. Mr. Berg saw discrimination as, pardon the pun, a black and
white issue. He apparently understood what “discrimination” meant so well that the
word in isolation did not merit discussion. Where he discusses discrimination is in
conjunction with the word “intentionally” to explain why “intentionally” was a
superfluous addition to Title VII. “Discrimination is by its nature intentional. It
involves both an action and a reason for the action. To discriminate ‘unintentionally’
on grounds of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin appears a contradiction in
terms.” Id. In contrast, Mr. Berg dismisses as too remote the possibility that a
subconscious intent to discriminate, that is submerged in the use of pejorative
language, could fall within Title VII’s protections. Id. at n. 14.
84. The legislative history strongly supports a limited definition for
“discrimination.” See H.R. REP. NO. 88-914, pt. 1, at 18 (1963) (H. R. 7152 “prohibits

2012]

TITLE VII WORKS – THAT’S WHY WE DON’T LIKE IT

61

Section 703(a) captures the responses to race Congress considered by
making the anticipated reactions of the time unlawful. The anticipated
reactions included rejecting an applicant because he or she was black,85
or segregating a black person with other black people because of the
belief that blacks could only be allowed to work certain kinds of jobs
and/or the belief that white employees would not work in an integrated
environment.86
Another good example of the congressionally intended meaning
of “discrimination” is the protection of seniority rights in Section
703(h). The problem with seniority rights was their well-known
relationship to the exclusion of black people from receiving all or some
of their benefits on the sole basis of skin color.87 Title VII allowed
these predations to go unpunished by being forward looking.88 Time
began for “bona fide” seniority systems with Title VII’s enactment.89
By virtue of the definition within Section 703(h), a seniority system
was “bona fide” and could continue functioning where there was no
“intention to discriminate.”90 “Discrimination,” therefore, meant no
longer using race to exclude blacks from the benefits of seniority and
no longer dispensing the benefits of seniority on the basis of race.

and provides the means of terminating the most serious types of discrimination.”); H.R.
REP. NO. 88-914, pt. 2, at 2 (1963) (“But this bill can and will commit our Nation to the
elimination of many of the worst manifestations of racial prejudice.”). See also Frank
Cloud Cooksey, The Role of Law in Equal Employment Opportunity, 7 B.C. L. REV.
417, 419-20 (1966) (arguing that Title VII will only address some of what Mr.
Cooksey describes as “unreasonable discrimination” and concluding that “[t]he role of
law in the area of equal employment opportunity is a limited one.”).
85. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, §703(a)(1), Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241
(1964).
86. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, §703(a)(2), Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241
(1964). Segregation was, of course, on the minds of the Nation and had been since
Brown v. Board of Education in 1954. In the employment context, a similar form of
segregation permeated labor unions. Section 703(c)(1) and (2) are a direct response to
this well-known phenomenon.
87. Professor Sovern’s 1962 article, supra note 76, is entirely dedicated to the
resolution of race discrimination in unions. See also Herbert Hill, The New Judicial
Perception of Employment Discrimination – Litigation Under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 43 U. COLO. L. REV. 243, 250-54 (1972) (describing the extent of
racial discrimination by and in unions).
88. See Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
89. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, §703(h), Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964).
90. Id.
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B. Legislative History
A comprehensive legislative history of Title VII is not necessary
to a view of what I have called the conflicting evidence.91 Legislative
history is only part of the story and need only describe the key events
that led to the gestation and birth of Title VII. These key events are
related to and work in concert with the background issues I described
supra in Parts I and II.A. Together they reveal the Title VII that not
only allows for Ash but promotes more decisions like Ash.

1. Kennedy’s Title VII
“The one thing Kennedy did not want was civil rights
legislation.”92 As events at home and abroad began to force his hand,
he began to turn himself to the issue. “Civil rights” for the Kennedy
administration, however, did not include a federal law prohibiting
private sector employment discrimination. The administration focused
on public rights, like to right to vote, rather than private rights like the
right to be free from discrimination in private employment.93
On February 28, 1963, Kennedy’s first message to Congress on
civil rights effectively established meritocracy as his guiding principle
on voting rights and school desegregation legislation.94 Kennedy’s
message included a section on employment, largely devoted to
detailing the executive branch’s efforts in federal employment and
91. The best early efforts at a comprehensive catalogue specific to Title VII’s
difficult legislative history are those of Mr. Vaas and Mr. Berg. See notes 47 and 62,
respectively. See also WHALENS, supra note 45; Note, Employment Discrimination:
State FEP Laws and the Impact of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 16 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 608 (1965); Enforcement of Fair Employment, supra note 60; Note,
Discrimination in Employment and in Housing: Private Enforcement Provisions of the
Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1968, 82 HARV. L. REV. 834 (1969); and the volume long
Developments in the Law publication of the Harvard Law Review, Employment
Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REV. 109
(1971).
92. WHALENS, supra note 45, at 15.
93. For example, Kennedy’s framing of civil rights as a moral issue in response to
events in Birmingham, Alabama in the summer of 1963 related only to education,
public accommodation, and voting. Kennedy’s vision of civil rights really never
included protections from discrimination in private employment. See Report on Civil
Rights, supra note 33. Although I agree with those, like Professor Trina Jones, who
sees that anti-discrimination law is in peril generally, see Trina Jones, AntiDiscrimination Law in Peril?, 75 MO. L. REV. 423, 425-26 (2010), any reliance on the
Kennedy legacy as a source for strong employment discrimination prohibitions is
misplaced.
94. See 109 CONG. REC. 3,245-49 (1963).
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contracting.95 Outside of the public sector, Kennedy’s vision of
95. Id. at 3,248. Kennedy was in the process of a two-pronged attack on the
employment issue. See id. at 3,245-49. The first prong, via executive orders
culminating in Executive Order 11246, meant to prevent the government from funding
discriminatory employment practices. The second prong was to use the quasi-judicial
powers of the NLRB to see that discrimination became an unfair labor practice. The
scope of the Kennedy Administration’s activity on the second prong is not clear. He
may have had the Hughes Tool case, 147 N.L.R.B. 166 (1964), in mind. That case
established racial discrimination in union membership as an unfair labor practice for
the first time. See id.
Kennedy’s strategy might have achieved the most important employment
discrimination goals of getting blacks in jobs. Freedom from employment
discrimination as an unfair labor practice would have all of the benefits of a public
right, including a federal agency to enforce the law. Practical economic benefits
attended this philosophical benefit. Banking on the desirability of lucrative government
contracts, compliance with executive orders would have put significant pressure on
industry to cease discriminatory employment practices and perhaps to engage in what
would have been, at the time, legal preferences in favor of blacks. To the degree the
contractors were also unionized, a steady stream of successful unfair labor practice
charges would put blacks in jobs and in line for better, more skilled, higher paying
jobs.
Kennedy’s strategy might have achieved all of this without serious risk to an omnibus
civil rights law. He must have been aware of the rancor in the House over the recent
attempts in 1962 and 1963 on H.R. 10144 and H.R. 405, respectively, to get a free
standing federal fair employment practices bill out of committee. This knowledge
could explain the absence of a strong federal fair employment practices title in his
original proposal for omnibus civil rights legislation, which became H.R. 7152. It also
explains his statements to the civil rights leadership after the March on Washington on
August 28, 1963. Kennedy explained to the black leadership that Representative
McCulloch told Kennedy that if he, McCulloch, wanted to defeat omnibus legislation,
he would put in a fair employment practices title, vote for it, and watch it die in the
house. See WHALENS, supra note 45, at 26-27. McCulloch was a core member of the
center position that ultimately allowed the Civil Rights Act to become law. See id at
29-71.
Additionally, the history of H.R. 10144 and H.R. 405 may have taught him that federal
employment discrimination legislation was toxic to omnibus civil rights legislation.
One of the problems was whether employment discrimination was a proper field for
federal intervention. Opponents of federal action asserted federalism and “the force of
public opinion” as solutions. See H.R. Rep. No. 88-570, at 2318 (1963). They claimed
that federal legislation on the issue was, if not immoral, a counterproductive idea that
would “tend[] to breed contempt for the law and a public apathy about moral values.”
Id. Moreover, neither H.R. 10144 nor H.R. 405 provided for a court trial of
discrimination claims. Opponents claimed that these bills endangered the fundamental
right to a court trial. Id. The bills also put enforcement in the hands of a federal agency
that mirrored the NLRB. Opponents did not want another quasi-judicial agency on a
crusade and feared that “the accused . . . as a practical matter . . . must bear the burden
of proving his freedom from guilt.” Id. at 2314. Had Kennedy’s employment
discrimination strategy remained in place, rather than being supplanted by a strong
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employment discrimination as a national problem focused on unions.96
He envisioned using the NLRB as the way to reach private
employment discrimination once the NLRB decided, under the
prodding of the Department of Justice, that racial discrimination was
an unfair labor practice.97 Kennedy “hope[d] that administrative action
and litigation [would] make unnecessary the enactment of legislation
with respect to union discrimination.”98
Kennedy’s second address to Congress on civil rights on June 19,
1963, fulfilled the nationally televised promise he made on June 11,
1963, to send Congress omnibus civil rights legislation.99 Between the
11th and the 19th, the administration’s early drafts of the Civil Rights
Act of 1963 did not include any federal fair employment practices
titles.100 The version of the administration’s bill that was submitted in
the House as H.R. 7152 on June 20, 1963 was the first version that
mentioned an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in its
seventh title.101 The sole aim of that version of Title VII was the
prevention of discrimination by government contractors and
subcontractors.102 Kennedy believed that a strong fair employment
practices component jeopardized the entire civil rights effort.103
federal fair employment practices title in the omnibus legislation, there would have
been little to attack and dismember under the guise of a bi-partisan compromise.
96. See 109 CONG. REC. 3,245-49 (1963).
97. Id. at 3,245.
98. Id.
99. See Report on Civil Rights, supra note 33.
100. See Civil Rights Act of 1963 (June 13,1963),.http://www.jfklibrary.org/AssetViewer/Archives/JFKPOF-053-004.aspx. (last visited May 8, 2012). This draft
included only five titles, none of which addressed employment discrimination. See id.
Another version of the proposed legislation, with a penciled date of June 17, 1963, had
six titles and no employment discrimination title. See id.
101. See H.R. REP. NO. 88-914, pt. 1 (1963).
102. Id. at 35 (“It shall be the function of the Commission to prevent discrimination
against employees or applicants for employment because of race, color, religion, or
national origin by Government contractors and subcontractors, and by contractors and
subcontractors participating in programs or activities in which direct or indirect
financial assistance by the United States Government is provided . . . .”).
103. See WHALENS, supra note 45, at 27. Attorney General Robert Kennedy’s
testimony before the House Judiciary Committee on October 15-16, 1963 is hard to
square with the administration’s steady and deliberate avoidance of federal legislation
on discrimination in private employment. By the time of those hearings, Subcommittee
No. 5 had substituted Kennedy’s Title VII with a formidable title aimed exactly at
discrimination in private employment. Attorney General Kennedy testified that “the
President strongly endorsed Federal fair employment practices legislation applicable to
both employers and unions.” Civil Rights Act of 1963: Hearing on H.R. 7152 Before
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2. Replacing Kennedy’s Title VII
Before October 1963, the House subcommittee responsible for
H.R.7152 discarded the Kennedy administration’s proposed Title VII
and replaced it with what had been H.R. 405.104 In 1963 H.R. 405 was
the latest of a succession of failed attempts at federal fair employment
practices legislation.105 Its predecessor from 1962 was H. R. 10144.106
The story of the development of this fair employment practices
legislation, outside of the context of omnibus civil rights legislation,
foreshadows much of the debate that occurred over H.R. 7152 in the
House and the Senate.107 And, if one can safely assume that the
Kennedy administration was aware of this story, the discussion of these
bills in the House Committee on Education and Labor explains
Kennedy’s prescience of the potentially catastrophic impact potent
federal fair employment practices legislation would have on passing an
omnibus civil rights bill.108
The Committee Report on H.R. 405, nevertheless, gives
significant insight into what the legislators most likely thought of as
“discrimination” in employment.109 One of the themes of the
Committee Report matches Kennedy’s focus on unions as a source of
the discrimination. Another theme, which went largely without
comment elsewhere, was the psychology of separation. These themes
explain that the “discrimination” addressed in H.R. 405 was of two
kinds. One form of discrimination was based on decisional reactions to
readily identifiable immutable characteristics. H.R. 405 addressed this
form of discrimination by making it unlawful to make adverse
employment
decisions
based
on
observable
immutable
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong. 2660 (1963). Attorney General Kennedy
also made clear, however, that the administration was well aware that the potent Title
VII contained in H.R. 7152 at that time could endanger the passage of the entire civil
rights act. Id. at 2661.
104. See H.R. REP. NO. 88-570 (1963) (“A Bill to Prohibit Discrimination in
Employment in Certain Cases Because of Race, Religion, Color, National Origin,
Ancestry or Age.” The short title was to have been the “Federal Equal Employment
Opportunity Act.” See also Vaas, supra note 47, at 433 (“H.R. 405 is the nominal
ancestor of Title VII.”); WHALENS, supra note 45, at 35.
105. Failed in the sense of dying in the House after having been successfully
reported out of committee. See Vaas, supra note 62, at 433 n. 10, 434.
106. See id. at 433 n. 10; H.R. REP. NO. 88-570 (1963).
107. See infra notes 109-48 and accompanying text.
108. WHALENS, supra note 45, at 26-27.
109. See infra note 105.
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characteristics.110 The other form of discrimination the legislators had
in mind occurred only after employment and it was based on the
physical actions and mental attitude that accompanied segregation.
H.R. 405 dealt with this form of discrimination by prohibiting the habit
or practice of assuming that race or color was limiting; from continuing
the segregation of blacks into menial, low paying work and/or actually
physically segregating employees. The first version of H.R. 405 is
otherwise noteworthy for its inclusion of age as a protected class and
the only class subject to what became a powerful protection of union
seniority against all classes protected by Title VII: “but no
discrimination arising by reason of the operation of a bona fide
seniority system shall be deemed an unlawful employment practice”
based on age.111
H.R. 405’s explosiveness came from its close resemblance to the
NLRA in its key enforcement provision.112 Like the National Labor
Relations Board, H.R. 405 created an Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission with quasi-judicial powers.113 The Commission was
“empowered . . . to prevent any person from engaging in any unlawful
employment practice.”114 These powers included, after a Commission
hearing and a finding by a preponderance of the evidence that a
respondent had engaged in any unlawful employment practice, the
ability to issue cease and desist orders “and to take such affirmative
action, including reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without
back pay . . . .”115 In this version of H.R. 405, however, there was no
effort to separate the EEOC’s investigative and prosecutorial functions
from its judicial functions.116 Once an unlawful employment practice
charge was filed, the EEOC took ownership of the charge.117 There was
no provision for a claimant under H.R. 405 to seek direct judicial
intervention.118 Any dispute over a Commission decision could be
110. See H.R. REP. NO. 88-570, at 2300 (1963).
111. See id. at § 6(a) (“Discrimination Because of Age.”).
112. See id. at 2314 (1963) (“We must vigorously object to the administrative
procedure which has been incorporated in this bill by the majority members of the
committee.”); Berg, supra note 62, at 65; Vaas, supra note 47, at 436-37.
113. H.R. REP. NO. 88-570, §§ 8 and 9 (1963).
114. Id. at § 9(a).
115. Id. at § 9(j).
116. Id. at §§ 9(a) – (j).
117. Id. at § 9(b).
118. Only the Commission could petition a United States Court of Appeals for
enforcement of any Commission-issued cease and desist order. Id. at § 10(a). “Any
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reviewed in a United States Circuit Court of Appeals – where the
factual findings of the Commission, if supported by substantial
evidence, would have conclusive effect.119 In the context of the debate
over public and private rights, the initial version of H.R. 405 was as
close to elevating employment discrimination to the rank of public
rights as any legislation in the Civil Rights Era.120
On July 22, 1963, the House Committee on Education and Labor
reported out the “Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1963.”121 This
version of H. R. 405, with minor modifications, replaced Kennedy’s
proposed Title VII in H. R. 7152.122 By July 1963, the committee
deleted age as a protected class123 and added bona fide occupational
qualifications (“BFOQs”) as a narrow exception for occupational
qualifications based on religion and national origin.124 The only other
major changes related to the structure of the EEOC as the enforcer of
equal employment opportunity and the ability of an employer to avoid
liability.
In response to criticism about making the EEOC the investigator,
prosecutor and judge, H. R. 405 now described the Commission as a
“vessel” for a Board and an Office of the Administrator.125 The Board
housed the judicial functions.126 The Administrator housed the
investigative and prosecutorial functions.127 In a related addition, where
the Administrator failed to prosecute a charge, a charging party could
apply to a federal court to compel the Administrator to issue and
person aggrieved by a final order of the Commission” could use the same avenue for
relief from a Commission determination. Id. at § 10(h).
119. Id. at § 10(d). This was the same procedure used in cases under the NLRA. See
Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
120. See discussion supra Part II.A.1.
121. See H.R. REP. NO. 88-570, at 2300 (1963).
122. See id.
123. See id. Age as a basis for employment discrimination legislation was consigned
to the Secretary of Labor for study. Congress retained this provision in Title VII and
ultimately handled age discrimination in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967.
124. Id. at 2307.
125. “The major purpose of this functional division within the Commission is to
separate to the greatest degree feasible the functions of ‘prosecutor’ and ‘judge’.” Id. at
2304.
126. “The Board is primarily a quasi-judicial body with power to hear and determine
complaints and issue lawful and appropriate orders.” Id. at 2303.
127. “The Office of the Administrator, headed by the Administrator, is the body
responsible for the continuing implementation of the act in its entirety. Id. at 2303-04.
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prosecute a charge.128 There was still no mechanism allowing or
requiring an individual charging party to seek judicial relief on his
own. The Committee explained the need to house the enforcement of
federal employment discrimination law in a federal agency as
consistent with existing federal and state fair employment practices
agencies.129 Moreover, a “one–stop shop” for employment
discrimination held the most important merit of speed.
Justice delayed, is justice denied,” applies especially with
great force in this area. Undue delay in achieving a final
decision could make the ultimate result a pyrrhic victory.
In addition to speed, this procedure would reduce costs for
parties, allow for greater informality and flexibility,
provide greater uniformity of result within a shorter
period, and tend toward the development and contribution
of expertise in the area, be conducive to continuing
supervision of compliance, create greater motivation to
reach informal agreements, and establish unified
implementation of a truly national policy.130
In keeping with the limited definition of “discrimination” and
meritocracy as the leitmotif of the Era, the Committee also explained
that H.R. 405’s operative provisions protect individuals rather than
groups, “and [are] not intended to discriminate in favor of or against
individual members of any group.”131 The distinctions Congressmen
made here are noteworthy. The focus on the individual comports with
meritocracy; “encourag[ing] the consideration of individuals for
employment based upon merit, capability, competence, effort, and
other factors not related to an individual’s race”.132 The expression of
meritocracy in H.R. 405 therefore abandoned groups as a suspect class.
These Congressmen also rejected the notion of disparate impact. The
Committee affirmed that disproportional representation133 of any kind
128. “Where the Administrator fails or refuses to issue a complaint within a
reasonable time, the person filing the charge may petition a Federal court to require the
Administrator to issue such a complaint. This is intended to inhibit unjustifiable delay
or rejection of remedial action.” Id. at 2304.
129. “This is the procedural pattern followed by the vast majority of State [sic] fair
employment practice laws, as well as a traditional practice among many independent
federal agencies.” Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. “Nothing in the act is intended to allow charges to be brought based upon a
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could not support a charge of discrimination under H.R. 405.134
Moreover, the Committee’s discussion of “[g]eneral rules as to
percentages and quotas” to establish proportional representation
demonstrates consideration and rejection of affirmative action of any
kind.135 The Commission could, however consider disproportionate
representation as background evidence in any proceeding.136
Also consistent with the idea of a narrow definition of
“discrimination” and the kind of behavior that could result in liability;
H.R. 405 addressed the issue of defenses against charges of
employment discrimination. Initially, H.R. 405 only described the
result of a finding that discrimination occurred without consideration
of the impact on an award of relief if any adverse employment action
was explained by any reason other than a proscribed characteristic.137
This could have become an any taint standard which acknowledged the
reality that multiple factors can influence any decision, but cause the
decision to be irretrievably tainted by the presence of a proscribed
characteristic.138
This version of H.R. 405 is the law the majority of the Committee
favored, but it would be error to call it the pivot139 position from which
disproportionate representation of members of any race, religion, color, national origin,
or ancestry within any business enterprise or labor organization.” Id.
134. “General rules as to percentages, quotas, or other proportional representation
shall not be the basis of charges brought under this act.” Id.
135. Id. I must acknowledge that the Committee’s language is somewhat ambiguous.
By stating that “General rules as to percentages, quotas, or other proportional
representation shall not be the basis of charges brought under this act[,]” the
Committee may have suggested that such rules might be established and would not
violate the law. In that case, the Committee intended to permit affirmative action under
H.R. 405. This conclusion is probably not what the Committee intended. It is
completely inconsistent with the meritocracy discussion surrounding it. None of the
additional, supporting, minority, or supplemental view in H.R. Rep. 570 mentions
affirmative action, which they surely would have done in the face of a proposal that
jobs could legally be set aside for blacks because of disproportionate employment.
Finally, such an idea is inconsistent with the fact that the remedies of H.R. 405 were
meant to be entirely prospective.
136. Id. at 2305.
137. See id. at § 9(j).
138. See Mark S. Brodin, The Standard of Causation in the Mixed-Motive Title VII
Action: A Social Policy Perspective, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 292, 296 (1982) (any “‘taint’
standard of causation . . . would make unlawful a decision based even in part on a
racial motive.”).
139. I have adopted the terms “pivot” and “pivot legislators” from Professors
Rodriguez and Weingast who use it to describe the legislators without whom the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 could not have passed. Rodriguez & Weingast, supra note 30, at
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H.R. 405 would survive intact as the law of the land. Instead, it
represents one extremity of the debate140 which, as I argue in the
following sections, represented an untenable perspective. The other
equally untenable perspective condemned federal employment
discrimination law outright.141 Although untenable, the antiemployment discrimination argument resonated in certain respects. It
captured parts of the Civil Rights Era meritocracy, in pointing out the
financial and social hardships on employers and workers. Those
against a powerful federal law hinted at issues of wealth redistribution
and federalism in the right to make employment decisions on any basis
without cost.142 It also more directly faced the specter of which existing
rights would have to be limited in favor of eradicating employment
discrimination.143 These arguments resonated strongly with the pivot
legislators which an omnibus civil rights package would require for
passage. For that reason, the EEOC envisioned in H.R. 405 merits
additional discussion.
An EEOC that functioned like the NLRB was rejected in the 1962
iteration of an equal employment opportunity law in H.R. 10144 for

1436. The term also distinguishes “pivot legislators” from legislators Professors
Rodriguez and Weingast describe as “ardent supporters” in their meticulous discussion
of where courts should focus in legislative history to find the best source of the actual
intent of the legislators. Professors Rodriguez and Weingast argue that for purposes of
consistent statutory interpretation courts should give the statements of the pivot
legislators the most weight because “. . . they have the strongest incentives to
communicate reliably the act’s meaning . . .” Id. at 1448.
140. This extremity of the debate is defined by giving primacy to equal employment
opportunity. “There is no more crucial right that the right of equal opportunity to work
for a living and to acquire the material blessings of life for self and family.” H.R. REP.
NO. 88-570, at 2317 (1963).
141. See id. In Commenting on H. R. 405 in its form as Title VII to H. R. 7152,
Representative Meader thought Title VII an “ill-devised limitation upon the area of
discretion and decision-making of both American business and American workers[,]”
and for that reason among others opined that Title VII be deleted from the Civil Rights
Act. H.R. REP. NO. 88-914, pt. 1, at 57 (1963). Extreme conservatives paraded hot
button issues like having to choose a “Negro” despite personal preferences against
“Negros,” and hiring by quota to achieve numerical racial balance. They went on to
predict a virtual social Armageddon: “If this title of this legislation becomes a statute,
we predict that it will be as bitterly resented and equally as abortive as was the 18th
Amendment [prohibition], and what it will do to the political equilibrium, the social
tranquility, and the economic stability of the American society, no one can predict.” Id.
at 111.
142. See id. at 57-58.
143. See H.R. REP. NO. 88-570, at 2302 (1963).
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two reasons.144 First, it was claimed that an agency with quasi–judicial
power violated the American principal that a “fair trial” could only be
achieved in a court of law.145 Second, it was observed that the state fair
employment practices agencies, many of which resembled the NLRB
in their enforcement powers, achieved more success in conciliation
efforts than through hearings and cease and desist orders.146 These
pivot legislators, supporters of H. R. 405 in the Committee on
Education and Labor, believed:
Discrimination in employment on the basis of race,
religion, color, national origin or ancestry is contrary to
our national ideals and our national interest. But we do not
act very wisely if we destroy one fundamental right in our
zeal to protect another. * * * We believe it would be a
serious mistake if this legislation were to deny the right of
trial in a court of law, and we believe that such a denial
could only serve to undermine and weaken the moral force
of this legislation and public acceptance of it.147
Given the source of these sentiments and their underlying
criticism of the way the NLRB functioned, in addition to the fact that
H.R. 405’s predecessor, H.R. 10144, purposefully abandoned the
NLRB model, one can comfortably conclude that H.R. 405 appeared as
Title VIII in H.R. 7152 in anticipation of being traded away to secure
the Act’s passage.148
144. Id. at 16.
145. “The historic safeguard of trial before an impartial judiciary would be
abandoned in this bill by the majority in favor of hearings before a newly created
NLRB-type administrative tribunal, with only a limited right of review in a court of
appeals. It is unfortunate that the committee in its zeal to protect one civil right has
seen fit, unnecessarily, to cast aside other fundamental and well-established rights
which are at least of equal importance.” Id. at 15. “We regard the modern development
of trial by administrative tribunal as a threat to the liberties of every citizen. It is a
reactionary device in the truest sense of that word.” Id. at 20.
146. Id. at 16.
147. Id. at 17.
148. See WHALENS, supra note 45, at 37. The legislative history of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 in its entirety is often told as a tale of great success because of the overall
minimal impact of the Senate compromise on voting rights, public accommodations,
and school desegregation relative to what happened to Title VII. See WILLIAM N.
ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE
CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY, 20 (3d ed. 2001) (“Although the Democrats had allowed
Dirksen to make changes to the bill’s language, so that he could claim to have
significantly rewritten the bill, virtually all of the changes were cosmetic . . . not
weakening the substantive protections.”). Title VII viewed individually felt the brunt of
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3. Compromising Title VII
As H.R. 7152 worked its way through the House Judiciary
Committee, to the full House, then to the Senate—where it faced the
longest filibuster in history—and then through the “leadership
compromise;” Title VII became fully compromised. Compromised in
the sense of its components being traded away in favor of fulfilling the
Nation’s foundation promise of equality; a promise which found
substance in voting rights, public accommodations, and school
desegregation. The right to be free from discrimination in employment
was not comparable to these important problems. Despite the fact that
the famous “March on Washington” in August 1963 was actually
organized as a “March for Jobs and Freedom,”149 employment
discrimination never became a first class problem in the legislature.
Title VII was also compromised in the sense that it would
ultimately preserve rather than eradicate the status quo. Within the
universe, as they perceived it, the Members of the House Committee
on Labor and Employment structured H.R. 405 to take on the harsh
reality of black joblessness and imprisonment in low paying menial
work.150 When these Congressmen spoke about the symbiotic
relationship between earning a living, having a reason to vote, having
the ability to enjoy public accommodations and being motivated to
succeed in school, they had H. R. 405 as a pledge of sincerity.151 Once
the deal-making began, and others spoke these words, the obfuscation
is chilling.
In the House Judiciary Committee, the same people who said:
The right to vote . . . does not have much meaning on an
empty stomach. The impetus to achieve excellence in
education is lacking if gainful employment is closed to the
the compromise. Attorney General Kennedy acknowledged as much: “I recognize that
there are some experienced Members of Congress who feel that the inclusion of this
provision in the omnibus bill could make it difficult to secure a rule from the Rules
Committee and could even jeopardize ultimate passage of the omnibus bill.” Civil
Rights Hearings Before the Comm. on the Judiciary on H.R. 7152, 88th Cong. 2660
(1963). At the same time, the Attorney General hinted that the administration was not
behind fair employment practices legislation that endangered an omnibus civil rights
bill. Id. More openly he hinted that fair employment practices be severed from H. R.
7152 as an entirely separate goal. Id.
149. Garrow, supra note 73, at 284.
150. H.R. REP. NO. 88-570, at 2301 (1963).
151. Id.
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graduate. The opportunity to enter a restaurant or hotel is a
shallow victory where one’s pockets are empty.152
also said:
It must also be stressed that the Commission must confine
its activities to correcting abuse, not promoting equality
with mathematical certainty. In this regard, nothing in this
title permits a person to demand employment. Of greater
importance, the Commission will only jeopardize its
continued existence if it seeks to impose forced racial
balance upon employers and labor unions. Similarly,
management prerogatives, and union freedoms are to be
left undisturbed to the greatest extent possible. Internal
affairs of employers and labor organizations must not be
interfered with except to the limited extent that correction
is required in discrimination practices153
This statement represented the pivot position on employment
discrimination; the “consensus of the civil rights proponents” in the
House.154 Events in the Senate merely advanced the effort to leave
“management prerogatives and union freedoms . . . undisturbed to the
greatest extent possible.”155

a. Elimination of an NLRB-style EEOC
The House Judiciary Committee did most of the work of
eliminating an NLRB-style EEOC from Title VII. By the time H.R.
7152 was reported out of that committee, the EEOC had ceased to be a
quasi–judicial entity with broad enforcement powers.156 The pivotal
legislators did not want a crusading quasi-judicial agency to eradicate
employment discrimination.157 The Judiciary Committee stripped out
152. H.R. REP. NO. 88-914, pt. 2, at 26 (1963).
153. Id. at 29 (emphasis added).
154. Vaas, supra note 47, at 437.
155. H.R. REP. NO. 88-914, pt. 2, at 29 (1963).
156. Had Kennedy’s proposed Title VII remained in place in H. R. 7152, there
would have been little to attack and dismember under the guise of a bi-partisan
compromise. The opportunity presented itself when H. R. 405 took the place of Title
VII. Kennedy’s Title VII looked weak on employment discrimination. See WHALENS,
supra note 45, at 26. Those, who were strong on employment discrimination, the
leadership of the civil rights movement, had allies with sufficient conviction and ability
to put H.R. 405 into H. R. 7152. Id. at 36-7.
157. Vaas, supra note 47, at 450.

74

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI RACE AND SOCIAL JUSTICE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2

the judicial function entirely.158 All that remained was the
Commission’s ability to seek judicial relief for discrimination when
conciliation failed.159 During the “leadership compromise” phase of
H.R. 7152’s legislative history, the Senate completed the EEOC’s
emasculation.160 The Commission had no right to seek judicial relief
for claims of disparate treatment.161 These changes represented the
successful resonance of the “right to a fair trial” argument. As a policy
choice, the “right to a fair trial,” a phrase pregnant with reactionary
potential, was more important than the right to be free from
employment discrimination.162 So, in Title VII’s text and in effect, the
EEOC’s primary function would be conciliation not vindication.163

b. Protecting the Labor-Management Complex
Seniority rights represented another area where Congress could
secure the status quo contrary to Kennedy’s envisioned fair
employment practices plan.164 The Senate inserted protections for bona
158. WHALENS, supra note 45, at 58.
159. Vaas, supra note 47, at 436.
160. Berg, supra note 62, at 66-7.
161. Id.
162. “A substantial number of the committee members . . . preferred that the ultimate
determination of discrimination rest with the Federal Judiciary. Through this
requirement, we believe that the employer or labor union will have a fairer forum to
establish innocence since a trial de novo is required in district court proceedings . . . .”
H.R. REP. NO. 88-914, pt. 2, at 29 (1963).
163.
It must also be stressed that the Commission must confine its activities to
correcting abuse, not promoting equality with mathematical certainty. In
this regard, nothing in this title permits a person to demand employment.
Of greater importance, the Commission will only jeopardize its continued
existence if it seeks to impose forced racial balance upon employers and
labor unions.
1964 U. S. C. C. A. N. at 2516. See also Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr., INTRODUCTION,
7 B. C. Indus. & Com. L. Rev. 413 (1966). Roosevelt, the first chairman of the EEOC,
saw that Title VII on its face was lacking when he described the EEOC’s initial focus
as encouraging “business [to] go beyond the letter of the law in order to carry out the
spirit of the law.” Id. at 413-14. Chairman Roosevelt hoped that “persuasive and
aggressive promotion of affirmative action . . .” would fill the gaps in the letter of the
law. Id. Ironically, the Court would close this “affirmative action” gap in United Steele
Workers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979), by finding that voluntary
affirmative action (under certain circumstances) did not violate Title VII.
164. The plan President Kennedy outlined in his first message to Congress isolated
labor for special treatment. The President wanted to attack discrimination in the labormanagement complex. For a view of the scope and variety of the discrimination, see
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fide seniority systems in H.R. 7152.165 This language helped advance
that goal of preserving the status quo by protecting employers and
unions from the financial repercussions of the very specific harm
historical discrimination wrought on blacks in crafts and trades.166
The protections contained in this section of Title VII raise three
essential points. First, the act of insulating the known historical harms
from claims of discrimination gave substance to the pivot position on
the purpose of Title VII. What better place to begin giving meaning to
the directive that “management prerogatives, and union freedoms are to
be left undisturbed to the greatest extent possible”167 than to gift the
history of those prerogatives and freedoms with a blanket pardon? The
second point consist of eliminating any risk of a “windfall” wealth
redistribution had Title VII allowed blacks to attack the obvious and
generally Sovern, supra note 76, at 1.
(Negro workers are still disproportionately concentrated in the ranks of
the unskilled and semiskilled in both private and public employment.
They are also disproportionately represented among the unemployed
because their concentration in unskilled and semiskilled jobs . . . and
because Negro workers often have relatively low seniority.) (quotations
and citations omitted).
165. Vaas, supra note 47, at 449. Professors Rodriguez and Weingast concluded that
the primary work of the pivotal legislators in the Senate was to blunt the impact of
Title VII on the north where their constituencies dominated job opportunity, both as
management and labor, and discrimination was de facto rather than de jure. Rodriguez
& Weingast, supra note 30, at 1471-72; 1487 (“Taken as a whole these amendments
were designed to blunt the impact of the bill on the North and lower the perceived cost
of the Act to Republican constituents.”).
166. The connection between creating a safe harbor for “bona fide seniority systems”
and perpetuating an employment ghetto for blacks in unionized settings before Title
VII became operational in 1965 escaped the notice of the early legislative historians,
see Berg, supra note 62, at 73-74, and the voice of Title VII in the Senate, Hubert
Humphrey. To both of them the first part of 703(h) only meant that disparities in pay
and/or other terms and conditions of employment can be, and are, acceptable under
bona fide seniority or merit systems, so long as they aren’t used as an indirect means of
discrimination. Humphrey’s example was that an employer with two plants, one
predominately black and one predominately white, could have better pay and
conditions at one of the plants, so long as the employer did not intend to discriminate.
110 CONG. REC. 12,297 (1964). This ignores the fact that the difference was based on
intentional discrimination in the first place, that an employer and a union would escape
all liability for the impact of that intentional discrimination, and that an employer could
only be liable after 1965 if the employer actively continued to discriminate. Given the
truly imbedded nature of the harm that had already been done, there really was no
motivation for an employer or union to take an active role – the impact of the harm was
self-perpetuating.
167. H.R. REP. NO. 88-914, pt. 2, at 29 (1963).
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rich target presented by the historical depredations practiced between
union and management.168 Such a scenario could take on nightmarish
qualities where courts branded the “haves” as personally responsible
for administering a system where they were unjustly enriched by the
purposeful exclusion of the “have nots” and the courts compelled the
“haves” to divest themselves of finite, albeit ill-gotten, resources.169
The third point is that the central theme of the Civil Rights Era
effectively supplied Congress with the rationale for avoiding the
nightmare scenario. “Unearned” “windfalls” are by definition outside

168. What I call depredations were so notorious that they were President Kennedy’s
starting points in attacking employment discrimination, figured prominently in
Committee discussions of the need for federal fair employment practices legislation,
see H.R. REP. NO. 88-570 at 2(1963), and caught scholarly attention, see Sovern, supra
note 76.
169. Note, Title VII, Seniority Discrimination And The Incumbent Negro, 80 HARV.
L. REV. 1260 (1967). This Note, like all the scholarship analyzing Title VII in the years
immediately after its passage, struggles with the fact of Title VII’s limited protections
and its entirely prospective view. Id. at 1262. This Note is unique in specifically
addressing the problems arising from Title VII’s specific protections of bona fide
seniority systems which on their face insulate historical discrimination from Title VII’s
reach. Id. at 1263-1266. Arguing that in order to achieve Title VII’s purpose (“a desire
to eliminate the economic losses to the Negro and to the nation caused by racial
discrimination in employment”), the Note’s author urges courts to adopt a “rightful
place” approach to the issue of seniority discrimination under Title VII. Id. at 12731274. The “ ‘rightful place’ approach holds that the continued maintenance of the
relative competitive disadvantage imposed on Negroes by the past operation of a
discriminatory system violates Title VII . . .” Id. at 1268. Because Title VII outlaws the
segregation of jobs by race, “the ‘rightful place’ approach would allow an incumbent
Negro to bid for openings in ‘white’ jobs of comparable to those held by whites of
equal tenure, on the basis of his full length of service with the employer.” Id. The
“rightful place” approach was not vulnerable to a challenge of being retroactive or
requiring employers to take the impermissible step of discriminating in favor of blacks.
Moreover, “the ‘rightful place’ remedy does not deprive white workers of the benefits
of discrimination which have accrued to them in the past . . .” Id. at 1274 (italics
added).
The significance of this Note is that the “rightful place” approach became the answer to
the question posed in the seminal decision Quarles v. Philip Morris Inc., 279 F.Supp.
505 (E.D. Va 1968): “Are present consequences of past discrimination covered by
[Title VII]?” Id. at 510 (“A perceptive analysis of the problem and its solution, upon
which the court has freely drawn, may be found in Note, Title VII, Seniority
Discrimination And The Incumbent Negro, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1260 (1967).”) The
Quarles decision is cited with approval in Griggs, and has been credited with being the
source of the Court’s creation of the disparate impact theory of recovery. Robert
Belton, Title VII at Forty: A Brief Look at the Birth, Death and Resurrection of the
Disparate Impact Theory of Discrimination, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L. J. 431, 444446 (2005).
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of the parameters of meritocracy. To take from whites and give to
blacks
because
of
historical
racial
discrimination
was
incomprehensible in a new society suddenly struck “colorblind.”

c. Protecting an Employer’s Right to Test
Intelligence testing of job candidates did not arise as an issue
until H. R. 7152 arrived in the Senate.170 The trigger for Congress to
protect testing in Title VII came from an Illinois state fair employment
practices decision.171 In Myart v. Motorola, Inc.,172 Myart alleged that
Motorola did not hire him because he was black.173 One of Motorola’s
defenses was it did not hire Myart because he failed Motorola’s Test
No. 10, a general intelligence test.174 Motorola did not produce Myart’s
actual test or the Motorola employee who administered Myart’s test.175
Myart testified that he had passed Test No. 10. Motorola produced the
test’s author,176 who testified that it was the shortest test he knew of to
test verbal comprehension and ability to understand instructions.177
The hearing officer, finding for Myart, enjoined Motorola from
using Test No. 10. According to the hearing officer, Test No. 10 was
obsolete and had the effect of disadvantaging minority applicants
regardless of intent.178 Test No. 10’s “norm was derived from
standardization on advantaged groups. Studies in inequalities and
environmental factors since the publication of test No. 10 [in 1949]
have been made with careful equating of such background factors. . . .
[T]his test does not lend itself to equal opportunity to qualify for the
hitherto culturally deprived and the disadvantaged groups.”179 In
addition to ordering Motorola to cease and desist from using Test No.
10, the hearing officer ordered that, should the company replace the
test, any replacement “shall reflect and equate inequalities and
environmental factors among the disadvantaged and culturally
170. See Vaas, supra note 47, at 449.
171. See Berg, supra note 62, at 74.
172. 110 CONG. REC. 5,662-64 (1964).
173. Id. at 5,662.
174. Id. at 5,663.
175. Id.
176. “Dr. Shurrager developed a series of test for [Motorola, including Test No. 10,]
including tests of four different kinds of special relations and ability; and he regularly
supplies these tests to [Motorola] for a fee . . . .” Id.
177. Id. at 5,664.
178. Id.
179. Id.
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deprived groups.”180 The hearing officer also ordered Motorola to
employ Myart.181
Seen as a declaration that facially neutral tests cannot be used to
reject “disadvantaged and culturally deprived groups” unless the tests
account for “inequalities and environmental factors,” the hearing
officer’s decision in Myart and the Court’s decision in Griggs v. Duke
Power Company are effectively identical.182 Imbedded in the hearing
officer’s pronouncements of cultural deprivation and inequalities lay
the Griggs Court’s reasoning that the educational, and therefore
occupational, disparities caused by segregation could not be allowed to
be frozen in time by a facially neutral test that did not really test a
person’s ability to do a job, but instead tested the person himself.183
Fully aware of, Myart, Congress could have signaled its intent to allow
for the Griggs result by either remaining silent or by enacting a section
that prohibited testing on any other basis than an applicant or
employee’s ability to perform a specific job.184
Congress neither remained silent on testing nor prohibited the
kind of general intelligence testing for the group-wide discriminatory

180. Id.
181. Id. Myart’s compensatory demand was for employment, with back-pay, and
seniority from the date of his application. Id. at 5,662.
182. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U. S. 424 (1971). In 1971, the Griggs Court
created the disparate impact theory of recovery. See Robert Belton, Title VII at Forty:
A Brief Look at the Birth, Death and Resurrection of the Disparate Impact Theory of
Discrimination, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 431, 434 (2005). Griggs is also
significant for addressing the issue of the need for job tests and employment criteria to
be related to the actual job in question. “The touchstone is business necessity. If an
employment practice, which operates to exclude Negroes, cannot be shown to be
related to job performance, the practice is prohibited.” Griggs, 401 U. S. at 431. This
holding responded to Duke Power Company’s argument that Title VII specifically
authorized the use of professionally developed ability tests in Section 703(h). For this
holding, the Court relied on a combination of legislative history and the EEOC’s
interpretive guidelines to demonstrate the need for the test to relate to ability to
perform a specific job. To hold otherwise would allow a professionally developed test
to mask discrimination. “What Congress has forbidden is giving these devices and
mechanisms controlling force unless they are demonstrably a reasonable measure of
job performance.” Id. at 433–36.
183. Id.
184. See Rodriguez & Weingast supra note 30, at 1504-08 (discussing the
congressional response to Myart and the Court’s decision in Griggs). Note that
Congress was also fully aware of the purposeful discrimination of similar “literacy
tests” in the voting rights context and significantly circumscribed the use of such tests
in Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 with an eye to their eventual eradication.
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impact identified in Myart.185 Congress specifically acted to make sure
that the Myart result could not happen under Title VII.186 The Senate
leadership accepted the Tower Amendment to Title VII and the
following language ultimately appeared in Section 703(h): “nor shall it
be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to give and to act
upon the results of any professionally developed ability test provided
that such test is not designed, intended or used to discriminate . . . .”187
In 1964 Congress could not have known that in 1971 the Court would,
despite this language, reach the Myart result; a result that Congress
clearly and specifically intended to bar. Congress wanted management
prerogatives, including the giving of employment tests, to remain in
place. The clarity of the legislative intent on the issue made the Court’s
Griggs decision a usurpation of fundamental democratic principles and
therefore fundamentally illegitimate.188
Under the reasoning of Myart, almost all contemporary
employment testing would allow for a finding of an unlawful
employment practice because of the obviously ubiquitous design defect
of failing to account for the nationwide impacts of segregation on
education. Given the extreme likelihood of the design defect,
discrimination was built into the result of any employment aptitude
test. An employer taking action on the test result would necessarily be

185. See 110 CONG. REC. 5,664 (1964).
186. See Berg, supra note 62, at 74.
187. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(h), Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964).
188. The fact that Congress later legitimized Griggs in the Civil Rights Act of 1991
does not alleviate the concerns about the Court’s political behavior. The Court was
wrong to create disparate impact because the entire tenor of the legislative history
shows that Congress considered that segregation had seriously impaired blacks as a
group and decided to leave them impaired. “Nothing in the act is intended to allow
charges to be brought based upon a disproportionate representation . . . .”. H.R. REP.
NO. 88-570, at 2304 (1963). The demonstration of intent on testing is even stronger.
Not only was the legislature aware of the issue, it specifically responded to that
awareness by adding Section 703(h) to Title VII to keep general intelligence testing in
place without regard to whether the test accounted for historical “disadvantage” and
without regard to the relationship between the test and any specific job function. By
overriding Congress’ will on these issues, the Court created a false impression of Title
VII that we have yet to shed. Moreover, the Court creates a false impression of
reliability when it acts politically and claims the touchstones of democratic process as
justification. See Supreme Court Rhetoric, supra note 27, at 348 (“A review of the
Court’s discrimination doctrine indicates that the Court acted like a political branch . . .
. Those who have analyzed the political branches’ civil rights enforcement efforts have
generally concluded that the federal government lacked any solid commitment to racial
equality . . . .”).
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taking action to discriminate. Such a dramatic expansion of the
compass of “discrimination” logically added the real and undesirable
consequence of companies like Motorola being ordered to give jobs to
people like Myart along with back-pay and/or back-dated seniority.
The Tower amendment going largely unremarked189 can be
explained by the notion that if Title VII guaranteed anything, it only
guaranteed the equal opportunity to compete, regardless of history,
from a starting line drawn in 1963.190 Thus, this exchange between
Senator Dirksen, who had filed objections, and Senator Clark, one of
the leading Democrats tasked with the passage of the omnibus civil
rights legislation:
Objection: Under the bill, employers will no longer be able
to hire or promote on the basis of merit and performance.
Answer: Nothing in the bill will interfere with merit hiring
or merit promotion. The bill simply eliminates
consideration of color from the decision to hire or
promote.191
From this perspective, testing embodies the spirit of equality and
individual merit that animated the Civil Rights Movement.192 From a
different perspective, testing, like a flat tax, is at best regressive in an
economy where segregation prevented “have nots” from accumulating
the educational and experiential capital to survive the imposition of the
tax.193 From either perspective the employer’s ability to test was an
189. Compare Berg, supra note 62, at 74, who apparently saw the Tower amendment
as largely irrelevant (“Since the amendment did not effect a change in the previous
meaning of the title, no negative implication may be drawn from the reference to a
‘professionally developed ability test.’”), with Vaas, supra note 47, at 449, who
perceived what the logic of Myart portended (“The amendment is limited to an
employer’s use of such tests. Does this leave to door open for the EEOC or a court to
hold that use of such a test by an employment agency . . . is an unfair employment
practice if it results in “de facto discrimination,” and the user knows or should have
know that this would be the result?”).
190. See supra note 33 (President Kennedy’s announcement that America would
become a colorblind society).
191. 110 CONG. REC. 7,218 (1964).
192. See supra note 31.
193. This is the position the Court established in Griggs and Congress confirmed by
formally putting disparate impact into Title VII with the 1991 civil rights act
amendments in response to the Wards Cove Court’s attempt to turn back the clock on
Griggs. Morally, the Griggs court was right and Congress was equally right to formally
install disparate impact in Title VII. Nevertheless, I argue that the position staked out
by the centrists on Title VII intended testing, in partnership with the other factors I
describe, to help maintain the status quo. If, as the Griggs Court opined, Congress did
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unobjectionable part of existing management prerogatives,194 which
“expressly protects the employer’s right to insist that any prospective
applicant, Negro or white, must meet the applicable job
qualifications.”195

d. No Quotas
As part of Title VII’s compromise, the fact the federal law
rejected any requirement to adjust for racial imbalance, to hire by quota
or to specifically set aside opportunities for training and employment
comes as no surprise. The absence of such provisions in Title VII is
consistent with meritocracy. At bottom, however, this theme
harmonizes well with the goals of those desirous of protecting the
rights and interests of the majority. Nothing could or would result in
more discord for civil rights proponents or opponents than to take
limited resources from one group and give those resources to another
group because of race. Section 703(j) embodies these concepts.196
Section 703(j) also embodies the Nation’s rejection of atonement
for slavery and segregation. Slavery and segregation, their practical
impacts, ingrained behaviors and, perceptions were the reason for
racial imbalance in employment.197 This very imbalance caused the
legislators to comment on the need for Title VII.198 Yet, there was no
legislative movement for a direct correction of these imbalances in the
private sector.199 Moreover, there was a worrisome persistent call for
reassurance that Title VII could not be a remedy for the observed
imbalances, or by logical extension, an apology for the causes of the
imbalances.200
not intend to “freeze” black in place, they intended no more than a glacial pace for
progress in employment discrimination consistent with the imperative to preserve
existing management prerogatives and union freedoms.
194. Berg, supra note 62, at 74-75 (“Since the amendment did not effect a change in
the previous meaning of the title, no negative implication may be drawn from the
reference to a ‘professionally developed ability test.’ The issue in any case where the
use of any ability test is questioned is not whether the test is professionally developed .
. . but whether it is used in good faith or with intent to discriminate.”).
195. Berg, supra note 62, at 74, quoting 110 CONG. REC. 7,026 (1964).
196. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(j), Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964).
197. Roosevelt, at, supra note 163, at 414 (“There will be no social peace unless we
right ancient wrongs. That requires us to undo the damage done by 250 years of
slavery and 100 years of segregation.”).
198. See supra note 152.
199. No iteration of Title VII provided for quotas or hiring to racial balance.
200. See H.R. REP. NO. 88-914 (1963); Civil Rights Act of 1963: Hearing on H.R.
7152 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong. 2660 (1963).
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Whether one chooses to view Section 703(j) as imbedding
meritocracy in Title VII, its practical effect reinforced the status quo of
racial imbalance.201 Even if the idea of “racial balance” only occurred
to employers and labor organizations because of Section 703(j), that
section assured them that they could continue with their existing
intentionally racially imbalanced work force. Status quo, however, to
have its complete meaning must describe the behavior, mind-set and
beliefs that cause the imbalance as well as the resulting imbalance. Just
as 703(j) protects the result, so also it creates a safe haven for the truth
that segregation was and continues to be a social norm and that people
take as much “freedom” as they can to make sure they are not
associating with people they do not like even if the reasons for the
dislike become politically incorrect to articulate.
In a way, Section 703(j) also helps inform a contemporaneous
definition of “discrimination” by telling us what could not be required
and accordingly what would be allowed. Correcting for the effects of
slavery and segregation could not be required under Title VII.202 That
being the case, there was also no requirement to correct the belief
systems consistent with slavery and segregation that caused the
imbalance. Arguably, Section 703(j) approves of that belief system in
preserving its effects and not requiring adjustment. Therefore,
arguably, Title VII intentionally allows wide latitude for beliefs
consistent with slavery and segregation to be influential in such a way
that actions against individuals consistent with “discrimination” are not
legally discriminatory because the motivations for the actions are
consistent with Congress’s view of the very limited kind of
discrimination Title VII was designed to end.203

e. Placing the Enforcement Burden on the Individual
When the Senate placed the entirety of the enforcement burden on
201. The legislative history repeatedly refers to the significant disparity in
unemployment figures and the fact that the figures appeared to remain constant over
time. See H.R. REP. NO. 88-570 (1963); H.R. REP. NO. 88-914 (1963).
202. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(j), Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964).
203. Keeping in mind that I am discussing what appears to have been the intent of a
Congress, whose members were all products of a segregated society, if United States
Presidents can call black people “niggers” without suffering public ignominy, see
KENNEDY, supra note 82 employers and labor organizations might also verbalize their
beliefs without running afoul of Title VII. Even if expressed, bias or animus could be
and were disconnected from the kind of intentional action Congress censured in Title
VII.
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the individual claimants in disparate treatment cases,204 Title VII made
its final shift from a public to a private right.205 This shift stands out as
a commentary on how very difficult Congress intended it to be for a
claimant to prove intentional disparate treatment. In the first instance,
placing the enforcement burden on the individual makes the Title VII
rights less desirable because they are more burdensome.206 Congress
did not make this decision in the abstract. The legislators put the
enforcement burden on the party least able to successfully carry the
burden, and they knew it.207 To make that option even less attractive,
Congress made the less public and less financially rewarding avenue of
conciliation the least costly and least burdensome. The discriminator
would not be subject to public exposure208 and the discriminatee could
get something for free now, or pay for the risk of getting nothing later.
Congress took additional steps to assure that the burden of
enforcement included more than investments of time and money. If
Title VII were to have any value for disparate treatment claimants
beyond the suppression of gross acts of discrimination, that value
would only come from proving discrimination and receiving an
affirmative award of employment, or reinstatement with back pay.
Proving “discrimination” begs the question of the meaning of
“discrimination” under Title VII. Congress, however, failed to answer
the question by failing to define “discrimination.”209 Given the
acknowledged costs, Congress also made a successful disparate
treatment claim almost impossible by establishing that a protected
characteristic had to be the only reason for the discrimination in order
for a court to grant affirmative relief.210
204. 110 CONG. REC. 12,722, 12723 (1964).
205. See Berg, supra note 62, at 85; Enforcement of Fair Employment, supra note
60, at 432.
206. See Berg, supra note 62, at 96-97. That is also why the proponents of H.R. 405
wanted the EEOC to mirror the NLRB. See H.R. REP. NO. 88-570 (1963).
207. See 110 CONG. REC. 12,724 (1964).
208. Congress found it extremely important that the EEOC’s conciliation efforts be
private to protect allegations of discrimination from harming alleged discriminators in
the public eye. “This latter point is important, to prevent some irresponsible employee
or other person from, in effect, conspiring to blackmail an employer with the
publication of charges that may later prove to be false.” 110 CONG. REC. 14331 (June
18, 1964).
209. See infra note 211.
210. Mr. Berg concluded that: “The enforcement procedures of the title, however,
bear only too visibly the marks of compromise, and seem to me to contain serious
deficiencies. It seems questionable that much can be accomplished through suits in
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The Failure to Define “Discriminate”

The reason or reasons why Congress did not define
“discrimination” in Title VII remains obscure.211 It may be that
Congress was sensitive to “the evolutionary change that constitutional
law in the area racial discrimination was undergoing in 1964.”212 It may
also be that “discrimination” was left undefined in the Civil Rights Act
so that it might evolve.213 Within the context of the Congressional
action on Title VII, it may also be that “discrimination” was
understood well enough to be left undefined214 and that purposeful act
had the intended consequence of leaving a claimant hamstrung as they
attempted to prove discrimination in the form of disparate treatment.
federal court by persons aggrieved by acts of discrimination. The practical advantages
will lie heavily with the defendants, and even where the evidence of discrimination is
overwhelming, it cannot be expected that many complainants will undertake the burden
of an individual suit.” Berg, supra note 62, at 96-97. See also Charles T. Schmidt, Jr.,
Title VII: Coverage and Comments, 7 B.C. L. REV. 459, 462-63 (1965) (“And
compliance with the letter [of Title VII] – both in terms of coverage and substance –
may very well impose inconveniences and require more imagination to enable the
continuation of practices, which exclude Negros from employment, but the legislation,
as presently conceived, can do little to effectively prohibit these practices.”).
211. See generally Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 133 (1976) (“While there
is no necessary inference that Congress, in choosing this language, intended to
incorporate into Title VII the concepts of discrimination, which have evolved from
court decisions construing the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
the similarities between the congressional language and some of those decisions surely
indicate that the latter are a useful starting point in interpreting the former. Particularly
in the case of defining the term “discrimination,” which Congress has nowhere in Title
VII defined, those cases afford an existing body of law analyzing and discussing that
term in a legal context not wholly dissimilar to the concerns, which Congress
manifested in enacting Title VII.”); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,
337-38 (1978) (Brennan, J., White, J., Marshall, J., and Blackmun, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part) (“[T]he legislative history [of Title VI and,
more generally, the Civil Rights Act of 1964] shows that Congress specifically
eschewed any static definition of discrimination in favor of broad language that could
be shaped by experience, administrative necessity, and evolving judicial doctrine.
Although it is clear from the debates that the supporters of Title VI intended to ban
uses of race prohibited by the Constitution and, more specifically, the maintenance of
segregated facilities, they never precisely defined the term “discrimination,” or what
constituted an exclusion from participation or a denial of benefits on the ground of
race.”).
212. Bakke, at 339-40.
213. Id. at 337-39.
214. See discussion supra Part I.A.2.
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What can be known is that the absence of a definition of
“discrimination” in H. R. 7152 was a topic of discussion in the
legislature specifically regarding Title VI.215 The discussions specific
to H.R. 405, which became Title VII, are more substantive and
satisfying for having provided definitions of “discrimination.” In
hearings on H. R. 405 before the General Subcommittee on Labor of
the Committee on Education and Labor, Congressmen heard a number
of definitions for “discrimination”:
[E]mployment discrimination against Negroes is defined
as any behavior on the part of an employer toward a Negro
employee or potential employee, which reflects a negative
evaluation of that person’s race to the extent that the
employer either refuses to utilize that person or
underutilizes him, and/or underpays him.216
A simple definition is sufficient. Let us refer to
215. See 110 CONG. REC. 1,619 (1964) (“It [Title VI] is aimed toward eliminating
discrimination in federally assisted programs. It contains no guideposts and no
yardsticks as to what might constitute discrimination in carrying out federally aided
programs and projects.”) (statement of Rep. Abernethy); 110 CONG. REC. 1,632 (1964)
(“Nowhere in the bill [H.R. 7152] is the word ‘discrimination’ defined, so each
department and each agency [of the executive branch] could prescribe its own
definition, and the President could prescribe a definition for his actions.”) (statement of
Rep. Dowdy); 110 CONG. REC. 5,251 (1964) (“Title VI makes the cutoff [of Federal
aid programs] mandatory. All that is required is ‘an express finding’ of a failure to
comply with an undefined prohibition against discrimination in the administration of
any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance, and the President’s
approval.”) (statement of Sen. Talmadge); 110 CONG. REC. 5,611-12 (1964) (“I have
mentioned the fact that the word ‘discrimination’ is used in section 601 of Title VI.
The word ‘discrimination,’ without any context, means merely the act of treating one
differently from another. * * * The word ‘discrimination,’ as used in this reference, has
no contextual explanation whatever, other than the provision that the discrimination ‘is
to be against’ individuals participating in or benefiting from federally assisted
programs and activities on the ground specified. With this context, the discrimination
condemned by this reference occurs only when an individual is treated unequally or
unfairly because of his race, color, religion, or national origin. What constitutes
unequal or unfair treatment?”) (statement of Sen. Ervin); 110 CONG. REC. 6,052 (1964)
(“Such action [cutting federal funding] can also be taken when the agency finds that a
person has been subjected to discrimination under such programs. It may be clear
enough what the first two clauses mean, but if it means more than the first two, what
does the clause ‘subjected to discrimination’ mean? To what does that phrase apply?”)
(statement of Sen. Johnson).
216. Equal Employment Opportunity Hearings Before the General Subcomm. of
Labor of the Comm. On Education and Labor, 88th Cong., at 198 (1963) (testimony of
Walter B. Lewis, Director, Job Development, Washington Urban League).
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employment discrimination as any nonobjective behavior
on the part of an employer toward an employee or
potential employee, which reflects some intuitive negative
evaluation (prejudice) of the employee’s race to the extent
that the employer, when confronted with a manpower
need, will either not use the employee, underutilize him
and/or undercompensate him.217
Now, discrimination is practiced particularly when there is
a scarcity of employment opportunities. You get an
intensification of attitude by whites seeking to discriminate
against the Negroes because there are too few jobs to go
around. Of course, some will create artificial differences of
race or religion to allege to try to allege a superior claim to
employment.218
It is argued, we know, that discrimination springs from
prejudice, from bigotry, and that legislation cannot cure
it. We will agree that legislation cannot cure prejudice.
But legislation can prevent at least a part of the fruits of
prejudice from coming into harvest. Legislation is the
way, the only sure way we know, to limit the degree to
which people can act on their prejudices. It can eliminate
discrimination.219
All of these definitions reflect an understanding that employment
“discrimination” had two components: the denial of opportunity based
on a readily knowable, objective characteristic, and a subjective
motivation—prejudice—to take adverse action based on the objective
characteristic. These components suggest that the goal of preventing
discrimination is to limit the degree to which some intuitive negative
evaluation is able to be used to justify adverse employment action. So
by definition, intent to discriminate becomes irrelevant, if employment
“discrimination” is “any behavior on the part of an employer toward
[an] employee or potential employee, which reflects a negative
evaluation of that person’s race [color, religion, national origin or
217. Id. at 203-04 (testimony of Walter B. Lewis).
218. Id. at 70 (testimony of James Carey, President, International Union of
Electrical, Radio Machine Workers, AFL-CIO; Secretary-Treasurer, Industrial Union
Department, AFL-CIO).
219. Id. at 20 (testimony of James Carey).
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gender] to the extent that the employer either refuses to utilize that
person or underutilizes him/her, and/or underpays him/her.”220
Although it is encouraging that the hearings on H. R. 405
revealed these definitions, they are not so materially different from the
possible definition of discrimination reconstructed from Title VII’s
temporal context, and Congress did not adopt this or any definition of
“discrimination” in Title VII. One may therefore argue that Congress
understood that discrimination occurred because of prejudice against
an objective characteristic and that prejudice could be defined as any
behavior reflecting a non-objective negative evaluation. Refusing to
put this understanding in writing means that, regardless of what
Congress intended, it was not going to penalize just “any behavior . . .
which reflects a negative evaluation.”221
An “any behavior” definition of discrimination could also include
behaviors that were not socially objectionable at the time.222 To keep
“discrimination” from taking on such breadth, the behavior would have
to reflect prejudice and be an intentional act based on that prejudice to
the exclusion of other possible causes for an adverse personnel
decision. In that way, employment discrimination would at least have
to describe an extremely close relationship, if not an identity, between
belief and result. The additional burden on the individual disparate
treatment plaintiff was that in failing to provide a definition, Congress
gave no direction on how to successfully prove “discrimination”
outside of the most obvious cases where a statement of belief—nigger,
etc.—occurred contemporaneously with an adverse employment
decision.
ii. Enforcement of Title VII Rights
One could conclude, based on the current knowledge that proving
disparate treatment is extremely difficult,223 that Congress intended to
220. Id. at 203-04 (testimony of Walter B. Lewis).
221. Id. at 198 (testimony of Walter B. Lewis).
222. See supra note 203.
223. See Hard to Win, supra note 13. In addition to Professor Selmi’s observations
about why race discrimination cases seem hard to win, significant empirical work
supports the conclusion that they are hard to win Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J.
Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs In Federal Court: From Bad To
Worse?, 3 HARV. LAW & POL’Y REV. 103 (2009). Professor Wendy Parker describes
the fact that race discrimination cases have the least chance of success. See Wendy
Parker, Lessons In Losing: Race Discrimination In Employment, 81 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 889 (2006). Professor Parker concluded that plaintiffs are treated worse than
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make this burden extremely difficult to prove. Without speculating, it
is clear that the method of proving discrimination concerned the House
and Senate. One of the exchanges on this issue provides a fair example
of the nature of that concern:
Objection: If the employer discharges a Negro, he must
prove that the dismissal had nothing to do with race. When
an employer promotes or increases the pay of a white
employee, he must show that he was not biased against the
Negro worker who was not promoted.
Answer: The Commission must prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that the discharge or other personnel action
was because of race.224
The answer to this objection encapsulated the pivot position.
First, it needed to be clear that an employer did not need to prove
anything.225 Second, it needed to be clear that liability under Title VII
required intent: “because of race.”226
The relentless concern in the Senate about proving discrimination
is somewhat curious given the changes to the enforcement provision of
H.R. 405 before and after it became Title VII. Initially, H. R. 405 did
not address causation.227 It allowed the Commission, after finding an
unlawful employment practice by preponderance of the evidence, to
issue cease and desist orders, negative relief, and to “take such
affirmative action, including reinstatement or hiring of employees, with
or without back pay . . . as will effectuate the policies of the Act . . .”228
If the Commission found no unlawful employment practice, it was to
issue an appropriate order dismissing the complaint.”229 This was the
most liberal iteration of the causation issue; it made no statement about

defendants “for reasons that don’t appear to be race neutral.” Id. at 893 n. 15. Professor
Parker argues that there is judicial agreement ab initio with the employer defendants’
position that plaintiffs’ cases are meritless. Courts “proceed from a perception that
discredits the likelihood of plaintiffs’ claims and validates the defendants’ story.” Id. at
934.
224. 110 CONG. REC. 7,218 (1964).
225. The fear of an employer having the burden of proving the absence of
discrimination had been expressed in the committee report on H.R. 405. See H.R. REP.
NO. 88-570 (1963).
226. Id.
227. By “causation” I mean the necessary proof of harm to entitle a claimant to
affirmative, as opposed to negative, relief.
228. H.R. REP. NO. 88-570, § 9(j) (1963).
229. Id.
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intent and was likely to be enforced in the manner the NLRB enforced
the NLRA’s provisions on unfair labor practices in the discharge
context. As the NLRB was notorious at the time for readily finding
unfair labor practices,230 the EEOC was on a path toward establishing a
standard where a charging party could prevail by demonstrating that
race, color, religion or national origin (sex had not yet been added) was
merely a factor in an adverse decision.
The next iteration of H. R. 405 replaced Kennedy’s Title VII. H.
R. 405’s enforcement provision had changed to restrict the ease with
which causation could be found. The initial Title VII allowed the
Board231 after finding an unlawful employment practice by
preponderance of the evidence, to issue cease and desist orders and to
“take such affirmative action, including reinstatement or hiring of
employees, with or without back pay . . . as will effectuate the policies
of the title . . .”232 Now, however, instead of leaving the Board to its
own devices, Title VII commanded:
No order of the Board shall require the admission or
reinstatement of an individual as a member of a union or
the hiring, reinstatement, or promotion of an individual as
an employee, or the payment to him of any back pay, if
such individual was refused admission, suspended, or
expelled or was refused employment or advancement or
was suspended or discharged for any reason other than
race, religion, color, national origin, or ancestry.233
One logical way of reading this change is that the Board can only
award meaningful relief if race, religion, color, national origin or
ancestry was the only reason for the unlawful employment practice.234
“Any reason other than”235 those protected categories would be a
230. Id.
231. By this time, H. R. 405/Title VII reflected the split in the EEOC’s duties
between the Administrator as investigator and prosecutor and the Board as adjudicator.
232. H.R. REP. NO. 88-914 (1963).
233. Id. at 85-86 (emphasis added).
234. Professor Brodin presciently suggested that the distinction between negative
and affirmative relief would still allow the Board to grant negative relief if there was
disparate treatment for any reason in addition to the proscribed reasons. See Brodin,
supra note 138, at 298. See also St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U. S. 502, 523-24
(1993) (“Title VII does not award damages against employers who cannot prove a
nondiscriminatory reason for adverse employment action, but only against employers
who are proven to have taken adverse employment action by reason of (in the context
of the present case) race.”) (emphasis added).
235. H.R. REP. NO. 88-914, at 85-86 (1963) (emphasis added).
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complete bar to the only meaningful relief a disparate treatment
claimant would want: a job, a promotion, retroactive seniority and/or
back-pay. Although neither the text nor this reading address which
party would have to prove or disprove “any reason other than,”236
available evidence strongly suggests that “the [claimant] must prove by
a preponderance of the evidence that the discharge or other personnel
action was because of race.”237 This is a very satisfying standard of
causation if the desire is to limit the ability of a claimant to
successfully prove discrimination in all but the worst cases. It partially
serves the meritocracy theme when any other reason relates to
objective qualifications, skills or ability. It also serves the dominant
theme peculiar to Title VII, the preservation of the maximum extent of
management prerogatives and union freedoms which went well beyond
objective job performance criteria.
The next version of the enforcement provision changed
“discharged for any reason other than race, religion, color, national
origin, or ancestry”238 to “discharged for cause.”239 This language
represents a dramatic reversal of direction. “For cause” was a term of
art under federal labor law. It came into play when an employee
claimed an adverse employment decision, for example, occurred
because he or she had exercised his or her protected rights under the
NLRA. An employer responded to the employee’s allegation by
asserting that the adverse employment action was “for cause.” The
employer, however, had to show that the “cause” was the reason for the
adverse employment action untainted by an employee’s exercise of his
or her rights under the NLRA.240 “Cause” excluded most subjective
236. Id.
237. 110 CONG. REC. 7,218 (1964). See also H.R. REP. NO. 88-570 (1963).
Congressmen expressed their fear of employers having the de facto burden of proving
that they did not discriminate.
238. H.R. REP. NO. 88-914, at 86 (1963).
239. See Comment, Strike Misconduct: An Illusory Bar To Reinstatement, 72 YALE
L. J. 182, 194-197 (1962).
240. Bon-R Reproductions, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 309 F.2d 898, 906 (2nd Cir. 1962) (“It
is, of course, true, that §8(a)(3) is violated even if there is a legitimate motive for
discharging an employee if one of the motives is antagonism to unions.”), citing
N.L.R.B. v. Jamestown Sterling Corp., 211 F.2d 725, 726 (2nd Cir. 1954); Sunshine
Biscuits, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 274 F.2d 738, 742-43 (7th Cir. 1960); N.L.R.B. v. Lewis,
246 F.2d 886, 890 (9th Cir. 1957) (“There is no shortage of cases holding if one
discharges an employee, assigning or holding inwardly the wrong reason, it benefits
not the employer to have had a justifiable reason which he did not assert or which did
not motivate him.”).
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factors because subjectivity could easily be seen as an improper antiunion motive in the labor context.241 Therefore, had it been retained in
Title VII, a “for cause” standard reflected a definition of discrimination
that limited the degree to which subjective considerations could justify
adverse employment action. Moreover, if courts had held “for cause”
had the same meaning under Title VII as it had in federal labor law, an
employer would have had the burden to prove that the adverse decision
was untainted by considerations of race. The issues raised by the “for
cause” standard, however, never made it to the courts.
The final amendment to Title VII’s enforcement provision in the
House replaced “cause” with a formula almost identical to the language
that “cause” had replaced.242 The amendment was made “to specify
cause.”243 Representative Celler, the House sponsor of H.R. 7152,
explained that his amendment was to assure that a court “cannot find
any violation of the act which is based on facts other—and I emphasize
‘other’—than discrimination on the grounds of race . . . .”244 When
Title VII went to the Senate, it read:
No order of the court shall require the admission or
reinstatement of an individual as a member of a union or
the hiring, reinstatement, or promotion of an individual as
an employee, or the payment to him of any back pay, if
such individual was refused admission, suspended, or
expelled or was refused employment or advancement or
was suspended or discharged for any reason other than
discrimination on account of race, color, religion, sex or
national origin.245
Celler’s amendment returned causation to a standard that allowed
“any other reason” to trump a claim for affirmative relief for disparate
treatment.
The harum-scarum method Congress used to create the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 provides an explanation for continued calls for
241. See Int’l Union of United Brewery, Flour, Cereal, Soft Drink & Distillery
Workers of America v. N.L.R.B., 298 F.2d 297, 301 (D.C. Cir. 1961)(majority
concluded that employer’s “for cause” justification was “insincerely raised and was
utilized as a pure pretext to mask [employer’s] discriminatory purpose.”) In this way
“cause” is similar to the definition of “discrimination” witnesses offered to the
committee responsible for H.R. 405.
242. 110 CONG. REC. 2,567 (1964).
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id. (emphasis added).
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clarifying that Title VII only covered intentional discrimination based
only on a proscribed characteristic.246 Apparently, no one in the Senate
considered that Congressman Celler’s amendment effectively defined
discrimination as proof of an adverse personnel action based solely on
a proscribed characteristic by only permitting affirmative relief in the
complete absence of any reason other than a proscribed characteristic.
Likewise, no one recognized that the same amendment acknowledged
the existence of mixed motivations for an adverse personnel action by
allowing other contemporaneous reasons to defeat a claim for
affirmative relief. The failure to recognize the Cellar amendment’s
force can be attributed to the haphazard manner in which Title VII was
cobbled together or, a failure to debate the impact of replacing “for
cause” with Cellar’s language, or, perhaps, a conscious desire to avoid
an explicit statement that there could be no affirmative relief for a
successful claim of disparate treatment if race was not the sole factor
for the adverse employment decision. Whatever the reason, the failure
to recognize the implication of the Cellar amendment seems related to
an effort to add “solely” to the operative language of Section 703 so
that Title VII only prohibited discrimination “solely because of . . .” a
proscribed characteristic.
The effort to add “solely” failed.247 Senator McClellan of
Arkansas proposed adding the language “solely” so that section 703
would not “be a dragnet, a catchall, to leave something uncertain for a
court to interpret.”248 In support, Senator Long of Louisiana explained:
“I cannot for the life of me understand why someone would want to
insist on leaving out the word ‘solely,’ because my impression was that
if it were desired to hire someone because he was a brother-in-law or a
first cousin, a person could not complain that he failed to get the job
because of his race.”249 Senator Lausche from Ohio agreed that the
addition of “solely” was a mere clarification that “because of” really
meant “only because of.”250 Senators Case and Magnuson responded
that “solely” would negate Title VII.251 Senator Case also observed
that: “If anyone ever had an action that was motivated by a single
246. See 110 CONG. REC. 12,702-11 (1964) (Senators discuss the number of
amendments and the problem of duplication in an attempt to describe the current status
of the Civil Rights Act).
247. 110 CONG. REC. at 13,837-38 (1964).
248. Id. at 13,837.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id.
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cause, he is a different kind of animal from any I know of.”252
There were causation concerns, but the attempted addition of
“solely” in Section 703 is better described as part of the confusion
about the number and duplication of amendments, and the geographic
distance between the descriptions of unlawful employment practices in
Section 703 and the descriptions of the liability for those practices in
Section 706, coupled with Senator McClellan’s desire express what
everyone apparently understood: Title VII granted affirmative relief
where an adverse employment decision happened only because of one
or more proscribed criteria. The issue of mixed motives Senator Case
raised was already imbedded in Section 706(g). Therefore, Senator
Case partially erred in concluding that “solely” would negate Title
VII.253 “Solely” would have required a claimant to prove that race was
the only reason for an adverse employment decision to receive any
relief. The Celler amendment had already negated Title VII’s force by
compelling disparate treatment claimants to prove sole causation as the
predicate to the affirmative relief that gave Title VII rights any value.
One could prove discrimination but receive no affirmative relief where
other reasons, subjective or objective, existed.
Although the Senate resisted the urge to clarify Section 703 by
adding “solely,” they succumbed to the desire to clarify or amplify the
252. Id. Interestingly, no Senator disabused Senator Long of his understanding of
Title VII.
253. On this point, I must respectfully disagree with Professor Brodin’s assessment
of the rejection of McClellan’s amendment as evidence of the rejection of a “sole
factor” test under Title VII. See Brodin, supra note 138, at 287. Congressman Celler’s
amendment had already been made to Title VII and replaced “for cause” with “any
reason” and in doing so confirmed that affirmative relief would be denied where a
claimant failed to prove that there were no reasons other than proscribed reasons for an
adverse employment decision. To that end, there was no mixed-motives mystery in the
88th Congress. Moreover, an attempt to describe the operation of Sections 703 and
706(g) as one where a claimant can prove liability under Section 703, but receive no
affirmative relief only makes sense if Section 703 is viewed as something more than a
description of unlawful employment practices and Section 706(g) as something less
than a complete description of the standard of causation. Courts have come to
alternative conclusions, like Professor Brodin’s, but they have done so without giving
due consideration to the evolution of Title VII from H. R. 403, the evolution of what
became Section 706(g), and most specifically Congressman Celler’s tying relief to the
absence of any other reason including wanting to hire a brother-in-law or first cousin. I
agree with Professor Brodin that since Celler’s amendment only addressed conditions
on which a court could grant affirmative relief, it is possible that a court could grant
some other kind of relief. See id. at 298. Balanced against a job, a promotion, backdated seniority, or back-pay, what would be the value of any other kind of relief to a
disparate treatment plaintiff complaining about a refusal to hire or promote?
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necessity for intent by adding “intentionally” to the enforcement
provisions of Section 706(g).254 Before the amendment, the first
sentence of Section 706(g) allowed a court to award relief if it found
that “the respondent has engaged in or is engaging in an unlawful
employment practice.”255 As amended and in its current form, Section
706(g) authorizes relief where a claimant proves that “the respondent
has intentionally engaged in or is intentionally engaging in an unlawful
employment practice.”256
At the time of the amendment, “intentionally,” was seen as
essentially superfluous “[s]ince the title bars only discrimination
because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin it would seem to
already require intent.”257 It was not “a substantive change in the
title.”258 The addition simply clarified that there was no liability for
“inadvertent or accidental discriminations.”259 In the temporal context,
this description provides a snapshot of how Congress thought about
discrimination; it obviously had to be something that was done on
purpose. There was no reason in the segregated America of the early60’s to pretend otherwise.
On the other hand, actually adding “intentionally” to the statute
invited courts to give the language some meaning as the descriptor of
how a respondent was engaging in an unlawful employment practice.260
254. See 110 CONG. REC. 14,331 (1964) (“The Senate amendments require that no
employer can be held responsible for any violation, unless it can be proved that such a
violation was intentional.”); 110 CONG. REC. 14,331-32 (1964) (“A further safeguard
that was provided by the Senate amendment deals with proceedings against employers
in Federal court. It provides that the unlawful employment practice complained of must
be an intentional one: The employer must have intended to discriminate before a court
could grant any relief.”).
255. H.R. REP. NO. 88-914, at 12 (1963).
256. Civil Rights Act of 1964 §706(g), Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964).
257. 110 CONG. REC. 12,723 (1964) (remarks of Senator Humphrey, one of H. R.
7152’s key proponents).
258. Id.
259. Id. at 12,724.
260. See Berg, supra note 62, at 71. Mr. Berg predicted this outcome, but struggled
to comprehend its complete significance for two reasons. First, he appears to be
completely focused on what were literally issues of “black and white” at the time. So,
“unintentional discrimination” did not register in relation to proscribed criterion, that
were not self-declaratory. Second, because discrimination was something done on
purpose in his time, “unintentional discrimination” seemed far-fetched; an expression
of the subconscious impossible to prove. Accordingly, if it existed, such “unintentional
discrimination” was not a significant loss if exempted from coverage by Section
706(g). Id. at n. 14.
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If “intentionally” means that “the asserted act of discrimination must
have been knowingly and deliberately”261 based on a proscribed
characteristic, then its addition was more likely meant to address
discrimination claims where the proscribed characteristic was not open
and notorious, like religion or natural origin.262 In such cases, absence
of knowledge makes sense as a defense to liability. This reading also
makes sense of the legislative history. “Intentionally” did not
materially alter the understanding of Title VII, it merely clarified that it
was possible for an employer (claim) to lack sufficient knowledge of
the proscribed characteristic to discriminate and to place the burden of
establishing that knowledge on the claimant.263
Under this reading, in the ordinary course, intent would not be a
difficult proposition if it were restrained to assuring that the decisionmaker knew that the identity of the target of discrimination fell within
a proscribed category. Intent then describes a reason for an action. A
claimant would then be responsible for proving that his or her identity
was the only reason for the action in question: an adverse employment
decision. Given the language in Section 706(g)’s final sentence, the
burden of proof also required the exclusion of any reason other than the
claimant’s protected status.264
That this conclusion has been maddeningly perplexing is a

261. Id.
262. Not to exclude the possibility that race and color might be mistaken by, or
hidden from, a decision maker. America had been an involuntary genetic melting pot
for about 400 years. As a result, people, who would be legally defined as black under
the “one drop rule,” could be mistaken as white or could take advantage of being that
light-skinned, light-eyed, and fine-haired to escape the cruelty of segregation. See
LANGSTON HUGHES, THE WAYS OF WHITE FOLKS (1934).
263. This explanation also stands up to the fact that there was a proposal that
“willfully” be used to describe the manner of the unlawful employment practice so that
“[g]ood faith should be made a defense for all persons accused of discrimination.” 110
CONG. REC. 12,641 (1964). The proposal came from the Chamber of Commerce of the
United States, which was pressing for the complete elimination of Title VII from H. R.
7152. Id. Given the Chamber’s avowed animosity toward Title VII, it seems more
likely that adding “willfully” was an effort to make the burden of proof something
greater than simple intent for the kind of discrimination Congress tried to address. This
kind of discrimination included nothing more than the disparate treatment of
individuals and excluded the deliberate exclusion of blacks as a group in the sense of
requiring or promoting the correction of racial imbalances in hiring. The claim that
such discrimination could happen in “good faith,” in some general way so that all
persons accused of discrimination could claim “good faith” as a defense, is difficult to
square with the Chamber’s agenda at the time.
264. See Civil Rights Act of 1964 §706(g), Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964).
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combination of the expectations of the Civil Rights Era,265 the Court’s
excursions into lawmaking based on a manipulation of those
expectations as its statement of the “purpose” or “intent” of Title VII
changed,266 and an overreaction to the word “intentionally” in terms of
what it required in terms of the level of proof and what it could capture
as a descriptor of “discrimination.”267

III. WHY TITLE VII WORKS – UNDERSTANDING MCDONNELL
DOUGLAS
Disparate treatment cases like Ash demonstrate that Title VII is
serving the purposes of the Congress that created it: to assure that Title
VII minimally impacted existing management prerogatives and union
freedoms.268 This was immediately apparent to the early Title VII
scholars.269 They concluded that disparate treatment plaintiffs had little
chance of vindicating their rights under Title VII.270 In that sense,
results like Ash were predicted.271 Proponents of the view that Title VII
should eradicate all employment discrimination appealed to the courts
for enforcement the spirit rather than the letter of the law; further
evidencing the obvious and almost insurmountable difficulties in Title
VII’s text if its purpose went beyond eliminating only the most overt
kinds of discrimination.272 These difficulties were called problems or
failures and are still seen in those terms because of the strength of the
cognition that Title VII is meant to eradicate employment
discrimination. Giving the actual intent and purpose of Title VII its due
265. See supra Part I.
266. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 71, at 378-83 (observing that the Court’s
efforts to come to majoritarian, therefore “legitimate,” legal conclusions causes a
certain “anxiety over its creative law making role” and a form of obfuscation that
drives the Court to search for “objective” reasons to support a wholly “subjective”
outcome and an irrational reverence for such “objective” indicia.).
267. See Supreme Court Rhetoric, supra note 27.
268. See supra Part II.B.
269. See Berg, supra note 62, at 96-97; Affeldt, Part I, supra note 58, at 669;
Cooksey, supra note 84, at 419-420, 430; Schmidt, supra note 209, at 462-3 (“And
compliance with the letter [of Title VII] – both in terms of coverage and substance –
may very well impose inconveniences and require more imagination to enable the
continuation of practices which exclude Negros from employment, but the legislation,
as presently conceived, can do little to effectively prohibit these practices.”).
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Robert J. Affeldt, Title VII In The Federal Courts – Private Or Public Law
PART II, 15 VILL. L. REV. 1 (1971); Hill, supra note 87.
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weight dispels the cognitive dissonance.
The fact that Congress created Title VII, as to disparate treatment,
with a view to preserving the maxim extent possible of management
prerogatives circa 1964 invites an analysis of the Court’s
implementation of Congress’ mandate. Given the Court’s decisions in
Griggs, for example, where the Court demonstrated an allegiance to
purposes that Congress rejected,273 what explains the Court’s cleaving
so closely to the limits of Title VII in McDonnell Douglas and its
progeny? The answer does not reside in the McDonnell Douglas
decision itself. The opinion references the broad social policy that
animated Griggs and specifically declares that “Title VII tolerates no
racial discrimination, subtle or otherwise.”274 The Court then proceeds
to manufacture the infamous burden shifting analysis that married Title
VII to the identity Congress gave it in 1963 and 1964. The Court’s
sphinx-like decision explains little. One of the ways to understand it is
as a response to a dialogue commenced by the Eighth Circuit.
In the Eighth Circuit and below, McDonnell Douglas never
disputed Green’s qualifications to do the job.275 Instead, McDonnell
Douglas relied on Green’s involvement in illegal protest activity
against the company to deny him employment.276 In the Eighth Circuit
the divided panel relied heavily on Griggs to reject McDonnell
Douglas’s argument. The Eighth Circuit responded that hiring
decisions based on subjective criteria carried little weight.277 The
Eighth Circuit based this conclusion squarely on the Griggs holding:
“If an employment practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot
be shown to be related to job performance, the practice is
prohibited.”278 Following this reasoning, in words that completely
mirror Griggs, the 8th Circuit explained:
In enacting Title VII, Congress has mandated the removal
of racial barriers to employment. Judicial acceptance of
subjectively based hiring decisions must be limited if Title
VII is to be more that an illusory commitment to that end,
for subjective criteria may mask aspects of prohibited
prejudice. Employers seldom admit racial discrimination.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.

See discussion supra Part II.B.3c.
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792, 801 (1973).
Green v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 463 F.2d 337, 339 (8th Cir. 1972).
Id. at. 343.
Id.
Id. (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U. S. 424, 431 (1971)).
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Its presence is often cloaked in generalities or vague
criteria which do not measure an applicant’s qualifications
in terms of job requirements.279
***
Blind acceptance of any non-discriminatory reason offered
by an employer in a fair employment case would always
preclude correction of any discriminatory practices
otherwise existing. It has generally been said that an
employer may refuse to hire or decide to fire any employee
for any reason he chooses. Civil rights legislation and case
law dealing with discriminatory employment practices
have added modification to these principles.
Discriminatory motives even though they constitute only a
partial basis for an employer’s refusal to hire are not
sanctioned.280
***
The hard nut of it all is that the public interest to be carried
out in the legislative requirement of fair and equal
employment practices possesses a higher value that the
likes or dislikes of a particular employer.281
If the Supreme Court adopted the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning, it
would effectively define the language “discrimination” in Section 703
as a personnel decision: 1) based on non-job-related criteria; 2)
regardless of the facially non-discriminatory nature of the criteria; 3) so
long as the claimant was qualified to do the job. It would create an
environment where employers had to demonstrate an objective jobrelated cause for any adverse personnel decision. Given the close
philosophical ties to Griggs, adopting the Eighth Circuit’s conclusions
also opened doors to a version of Title VII in disparate treatment cases
that fully acknowledged the continuing negative impacts of historical
harm and made correcting for those impacts Title VII’s core purpose.
The Court, as we know, did not adopt this reasoning. In rejecting the
279. Id. at 343 (citations omitted). Since Green had the objective job qualifications,
McDonnell Douglas was unlikely to be able to avoid hiring him. “[i]f McDonnell’s
refusal to hire Green rests upon management’s personal dislike for Green or personal
distaste for his conduct in the civil rights field, Green is entitle to some relief.” Id. at
344. Twenty years later, in St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U. S. 502 (1993), the
Court approved personal animosity as a legal justification for an adverse employment
decision.
280. Id. at 345-6.
281. Id. at 346.
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Eighth Circuit’s attempt to apply and extend the Griggs interpretation
of Title VII, the Supreme Court’s McDonnell Douglas opinion gives
priority to the preservation of existing employer prerogatives to rely on
subjective criteria by limiting Griggs to its context. In doing so, the
Court adopted the company’s argument that Title VII protects
subjective decision-making.282
Without specifically addressing the individual elements of the 8th
Circuit’s description of how Title VII should work, the Court discretely
rejected them all. The Eighth Circuit found that subjective criteria
limited an employer’s ability to justify a decision.283 The Court
responded that “the [Eighth Circuit] seriously underestimated the
rebuttal weight to which [McDonnell Douglas’] reasons were
entitled.”284 It pronounced that an employment decision based on
unlawful conduct standing alone fell outside of Congress’ intentions to
remove arbitrary and unreasonable barriers to employment.285 The
Court’s statement about the weight to give employer justifications
coupled with its tacit approval of the use of decisional criteria not
related to ability to perform a particular job made employers’ evidence
of non-discriminatory reasons practically unassailable.286 Finally, by
resurrecting the legitimacy of McDonnell Douglas’ reason for refusing
Green, the Court also rejected the Eighth Circuit’s proposition that any
legal motivation for a personnel action would be irreparably tainted by
a coexisting discriminatory motive.287
The McDonnell Douglas decision, like Griggs, picks up on the
meritocracy theme. Unlike Griggs, however, McDonnell Douglas
282. The McDonnell Douglas Court specifically distinguished Griggs because
Griggs dealt with the disparate impacts of standardized testing and the impermissibility
of “freezing” blacks out of employment opportunities because of the continuing
impacts of segregation. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 805-06. Moreover, the
victims in Griggs had done nothing to deserve being excluded from employment
opportunities. Id. Green presented a different picture because Green engaged in illegal
protest activity. Id. at 806. McDonnell Douglas rejected him for that reason. Id.
283. Green, 463 F.3d at 343.
284. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 803.
285. Id. at 806.
286. Id. at 803.
287. Green, 463 F.3d at 346 (Judge Lay’s concurrence:
The evidence must show that the employee’s lawful activities . . . were in
no part a motivating factor in the employer’s decision and the reason for
the rejections is objectively related to job performance. Without this
showing any reason could otherwise be used to mask the denial of
protected rights.).
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conforms completely to the Civil Rights Era meritocracy as entirely
prospective in disparate treatment cases. In McDonnell Douglas, the
Court’s view of meritocracy is best seen from the vantage point of its
rejection of the 8th Circuit’s position on the issue. The Eighth Circuit
saw personnel decisions as merit determinations where the only
relevant merit was a candidate’s ability to perform the specific
functions of a given job. Subjective criteria, as the likely reservoir of
discriminatory thought and action, could not be suborned by Title VII.
The Court maintained the following view:
There are societal as well as personal interests on both
sides of this equation. The broad, overriding interest,
shared by employer, employee, and consumer, is efficient
and trustworthy workmanship assured through fair and
racially neutral employment and personnel decisions.288
The Court’s description of an overarching interest in “efficient
and trustworthy workmanship” stands in place of the words “individual
merit and achievement” and “colorblindness.” In the Court’s eyes,
meritocracy is the shared, therefore, dispositive principle.289 The Court,
however, did not explain the relationship between this conclusion and
Title VII and is criticized for creating “just one example of the many
statutory constructions enacted by the courts without due consideration
for statutory heritage.”290 That conclusion is based on the cognition that
Title VII tolerates no racial discrimination, “subtle or otherwise.”291
The conflicts within McDonnell Douglas call that belief into question.
An exploration of why the McDonnell Douglas Court did not explain
its reasoning helps to resolve the conflict.
Professors Eskridge and Frickey have observed that the Court’s
failure to candidly explain its answers to ambiguous questions is a
result of anxiety about how to give a legitimate explanation of its

288. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 801.
289. The import of this statement, however, is not limited to the Court’s views on
meritocracy. It is also a description of the tension between visions of Title VII as a
public (societal) law and as a private (personal) law. That said, the Court’s decision in
McDonnell Douglas to retain the scope and power of employer prerogatives had ample
support in the legislative history, despite the Court’s failure to rely on that history. See
Part II, supra for a discussion of the relevant legislative history and Part III, supra for a
discussion of how that legislative history supports the Court’s McDonnell Douglas
decision.
290. Sperino, supra note 19, at 805.
291. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 801.
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reasoning process.292 The anxiety drives the Court into the arms of
foundationalism where it usually finds something in the text, the
purpose or intent to link the decision to the statute. The statue is
legitimate because the elected representatives of the people created and
executed it. Any link to the source of legitimacy will do. In McDonnell
Douglas, however, this kind of anxiety does not account for the
complete absence of an explanation for the outcome. An explanation
was handy in the text and in the purpose or intent as described in the
legislative history. The Court could have explained that:
Under Section 706(g) as supported by the intent of the
Congressmen and Senators most responsible for crafting
and enacting Title VII, Mr. Green will have to prove that
his race was the only reason he was not hired. It was
obviously the legislature’s intent to preserve, to the
maximum
extent
possible
exiting
management
prerogatives. These prerogatives include reasons such as
the desire to hire a brother-in-law or first cousin. They
include personal animosity. They also include the
claimant’s acts of disloyalty and illegal protests of an
employer’s hiring practices.
The Court did not do this.
The availability of the usual elements of foundationalism and the
Court’s avoidance of them, leads to the conclusion that the Court’s lack
of candor in McDonnell Douglas and its progeny had a source other
than anxiety. A likely source of the Court’s reticence was its awareness
of Title VII’s significant limitations for disparate treatment plaintiffs
and it’s unwillingness to describe that knowledge because of the
impact the description would have had on themselves and the Country.
In light of the knowledge that we can safely insist the Court had or
should have had, not explaining the unanimous ruling of McDonnell
Douglas preserved the Court and the Country from the exposure of the
dissonance between what the Court achieved in Griggs293 and
Congress’ elevation of the protection of existing management
prerogatives above racial discrimination in employment.294
292. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 71, at 379.
293. Id. at 380 (“And whatever the problems of relativism in science or philosophy,
they are even more troubling in legal theory, where, because of the clear link between
law and political power, arbitrariness is most to be feared.”).
294. SITKOFF, supra note 73, at 210 (“The movement had secured basic civil rights
for African-Americans. . .”); WOODWARD, supra note 57, at v (“Thus within one
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Another answer to the question why the Court failed to explain
itself in McDonnell Douglas is simple: It did not have to. The urge to
explain is the child of the desire to establish legitimacy.295 In this case,
I think of legitimacy in terms of having reached the correct result from
both a foundational296 and an “evolutive” perspective.297 The more
week a historic movement reached its peak of achievement and optimism and
immediately confronted the beginning of a period of challenge and reaction called in
question some of its greatest hopes and aspirations.”).
In fact, by 1973, the backlash against civil rights was already in full swing. SITKOFF,
supra note 73, at 210 (“As the sixties ended, however, white backlash ruled the roost.”)
C. Vann Woodward seems to place the beginning of the backlash and the questioning
of what the Civil Rights movement achieved at the start of the Watts riots in August
1965. WOODWARD, supra note 57, at v. This suggests an early withdrawal from the
Civil Rights Era meritocracy. The rioting in the summers succeeding 1965 caused
President Johnson to establish a Commission on Civil Disorders by Executive Order in
1967. Exec. Order No.11,365, 32 Fed. Reg. 10907 (July 29, 1967). The Commission
issued its report in 1968 including the conclusion: “Our nation is moving toward two
societies, one black, one white - separate and unequal.” REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS, 1 (1968). This
conclusion is troubling for two reasons. First it suggests that there ever was one
society; calling for a suspension of disbelief that the Commission was either that naive
or this it was so steeped in meritocracy that the “playing field” actually became level
for them in 1964. Second, the conclusion suggests that outside of the Committee and
the 88th Congress meritocracy had never taken root, particularly among ghettoized
blacks in northern cities for whom the remedy of sudden color-blindness meant
nothing in terms of joblessness and its effects. With a certain amount of surprise the
Committee reported: “What white Americans have never fully understood but what the
Negro can never forget – is that white society is deeply implicated in the ghetto. White
institutions created it, white institutions maintain it, and white society condones it.” Id.
For whites, the backlash ascribed to black overreaching found political expression in
Nixon’s 1968 victory over McGovern and the eclipse of desire to continue to unravel
the tangled skein of slavery and more than 100 years of segregation. WOODWARD,
supra note 57, at 190-214. In fact, there may have been few who actually continued to
believe in Civil Rights Era meritocracy by 1973. Id. Nevertheless, the fiction of
meritocracy prevails. Professor Selmi, for example, argues that the difficulty of
employment discrimination cases based on race is based on a bias in the courts and that
bias is a result of a belief by judges in the success of meritocracy expressed as
skepticism of the “persistence of discrimination”. Selmi, Hard to Win, supra note 13,
at 562-563. See also Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 506 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(“At some time, we must acknowledge that it has become absurd to assume, without
any further proof, that violations of the Constitution dating from the days when
Lyndon Johnson was President . . . continue to have an appreciable effect upon current
operations of schools.”).
295. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 71, at 378-79.
296. At this point the, discussion requires the tools of statutory interpretation. I am
not entering the debate about the merits of any particular interpretive method. I have
chosen to rely on the ground breaking work of Professors Eskridge and Frickey in their
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legitimate a decision, the less reason the Court has to explain it. All of
the members of the Court believed the McDonnell Douglas result
legitimate. It has (albeit unexplained) strong foundational links.298 It is
article Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321 (1990),
for the necessary resources. For the purposes of this Article I rely on their descriptions
of the various traditional schools of statutory interpretation. “The three main theories
today emphasize (1) the actual or presumed intent of the legislature enacting the statute
(“intentionalism”); (2) the actual or presumed purpose of the statute (“purposivism” or
“modified intentionalism”) and (3) the literal commands of the statutory text
(“textualism”).” Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 71, at 324 (citation omitted).
Collectively referred to as “foundationalism” or “foundationalist” approaches to
statutory interpretation. Id. at 324-325.
297. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 71. According to Professors Eskridge and
Frickey, evolutive concerns cause contemporary policy concerns or values to impact
the Court’s statutory interpretation. They point to the Court’s decision in U. S. Steel
Workers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979), for example, as showing evolutive concerns
at work. Their premise for the Weber example is that “when it enacted Title VII,
Congress assumed that outlawing color-conscious employment decisions would
actually produce equal employment opportunity for blacks.” Id. at 359. Because blacks
were not enjoying equal employment opportunity, “at least partly because of covert
discrimination . . . the Court concluded in Weber that if the nation were to realize Title
VII’s goal of providing jobs for blacks, it would have to relax the requirement of colorblindness.” Id. Profesors Eskridge and Frickey concluded that Weber is a “clear
example” of the Court accounting for evolutive considerations: “social and legal
circumstances not anticipated when the statute was enacted.” Id. In other words, the
Congress not anticipating that Title VII would fail in its purpose in effecting the social
change of equal job opportunity, the Court stepped in and made a correction, See Id. at
342-343 (additional argument about how the 88th Congress in 1964 could not have
understood the need for, and therefore did not provide for, the remedy the Court
created in Weber fifteen years later.).
298. On this point I must differ with Professor Sperino, supra note 19. I completely
agree with her that we should demand more from federal employment discrimination
law than we receive. I also agree that McDonnell Douglas establishes a false
dichotomy between direct and circumstantial evidence in disparate treatment cases, to
the disadvantage of claims based on circumstantial evidence. See Sperino, supra note
19, at 773. I argue that is exactly why the false dichotomy exists. Direct evidence in
discrimination cases is understood as a blatant reference to a proscribed characteristic
at the time of an adverse employment decision. For example, an employer states to an
applicant that he or she is being rejected because he or she is black. All other disparate
treatment, or the behaviors that might reflect disparate treatment based on a proscribed
characteristic, is based on circumstantial evidence. But the very point of the
dichotomy, is that it prevents circumstantial evidence-based disparate treatment claims
from being successful because Title VII was only intended to prevent the worst kinds
of discrimination and to preserve as much of an employer’s decision–making latitude
as possible. See discussion supra in Parts II.
I also disagree that the McDonnell Douglas version of Title VII for individual victims
of disparate treatment is not justified by any statutory construction methodology.
Professor Sperino attacks McDonnell Douglas with the tools of statutory construction
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and concludes that the Court’s result has no textualist, intentionalist, or purposivist
grounding. See Sperino, supra note 19, at 764-74. The argument that McDonnell
Douglas is not grounded in Title VII’s text relies solely on the operative language in
Section 703(a). My view is that Section 703(a) cannot be read in isolation to discover
McDonnell Douglas’ link to Title VII’s text. Section 703(a) must be read in pari
materia with Section 706(g). Section 706(g) discusses the availability of affirmative
relief, only where an unlawful employment practice is proved in the absence of “any
reason other than discrimination on account of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.” § 706(g)(2)(A). The burden shifting gives life to this language by allowing the
employer to assert “any other reason” as a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason
without the burden of having to prove that reason as an affirmative defense. Moreover,
rather than compelling an employer to assert a reason, in contrast to an employer’s
right to make decisions for any or no reason under the at-will employment doctrine,
McDonnell Douglas’ invitation to offer a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason is one
that an employer may reject with little concern for the ultimate result. See Chad Derum
& Karen Engle, The Rise of the Personal Animosity Presumption in Title VII and the
Return to “No Cause” Employment, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1177, 1179 (2003) (“While it was
long presumed that, in the absence of an employers unrebutted, nondiscriminatory
reason, discrimination was the likely motivation for the defendant’s challenged action,
courts have begun to presume that personal animosity most likely motivated the
employer.”).
As to Professor Sperino’s argument that the legislative history does not support the
Court’s work in McDonnell Douglas from an intentionalist or purposivist perspective,
see Sperino, supra note 19, at 776, 779-80, it appears that Professor Sperino does not
give the legislative history the weight to which, I argue, it is entitled. It is true that the
legislative history does not explicitly authorize the Court to interpret Title VII. See id.
at 776. Title VII’s legislative history may also be “judicially incomprehensible,” id.
(citation omitted), but it is not nonexistent. As to the development of Title VII, in
general, and its enforcement provisions in particular, Professor Sperino does not
acknowledge Title VII’s role as a straw man for the overriding goal of omnibus civil
rights legislation in 1964. Or that its power was sacrificed as part of the deal because
the key players for the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 wanted Title VII to do
very little to impact existing management prerogatives and union freedoms. See
discussion supra Section II.B.3. Moreover, much of what appears to be the trouble
with Title VII is its insistence on qualifications. But qualification or individual merit
was a core theme of the Civil Rights Era, which resounds in Title VII and in the
version of Title VII described by McDonnell Douglas in making qualification part of
the prima facie case that establishes a presumption of discrimination. Furthermore, the
development of Section 706(g) gives significant information about the 88th Congress’
intent to make it difficult for disparate treatment plaintiffs to get, or want to get, a
financial recovery. For example, where Section 706(g) could have limited employer,
non-discriminatory reasons to “cause” they specifically resorted to “any other reason”
language. See discussion supra Section II.B.3.e.ii. If McDonnell Douglas’ version of
Title VII does anything, it carries out this legislative mandate by making Title VII
cases extremely hard to win, if winning includes affirmative relief.
Professor Sperino’s argument that McDonnell Douglas does not reflect Title VII’s
purpose relies on Section 703 to supply the statement of purpose. See Sperino, supra
note 19, at 781-82. I suggest that Section 703 in isolation cannot inform a complete or
accurate understanding of purpose. At a minimum, Section 703 must be read in
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also rationally distinguishable from Griggs on its facts. Griggs,
therefore, had no hold on the Court to keep it from blazing an entirely
new trail to disparate treatment. Being the first case in its line, there
was no need to rationalize a change in direction and explain why it was
legitimate. Having reached a legitimate result, the extreme
gravitational pull of stare decisis worked on the Court to keep the
result in place and expand on it consistent with the latitude self-citation
provides with the unacknowledged assistance of foundational links.299
The consequence has not only been achieving the 88th Congress
intentions from foundational point of view, but also affirming and
nurturing a variety of behaviors that those against civil rights worked
very hard to protect.300 Far from the “day of reckoning” predicted by
conjunction with 706(g) if the text of Title VII is to be the source of a description of its
purpose. When these sections are understood together, McDonnell Douglas has a
purposivist basis that is identical to its textual basis: to limit the chances of success for
disparate treatment cases based on circumstantial evidence. Another construction of
“purpose” for McDonnell Douglas exists. Professors Eskridge and Frickey candidly
describe “purpose” as “incoherent, unless one means the deal between rent-seeking
groups and reelection minded legislators.” Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 71, at 334.
That blunt description of purpose accurately describes Title VII’s purpose on several
levels. Title VII was set up to be sacrificed as part of the deal to get an omnibus civil
rights bill passed into law. See WHALENS, supra note 45, at 37. Title VII’s purpose,
therefore, was the purpose ascribed to it by the republican legislators, whose votes
were required to get the Civil Rights Act of 1964 out of Congress and onto President
Johnson’s desk for signature. In order to achieve that end, Title VII’s purpose is
summarized in the following statement: “management prerogatives and union
freedoms are to be left undisturbed to the greatest extent possible.” H.R. REP NO. 88914, pt. 2, at 29 (1963). McDonnell Douglas’ version of Title VII admirably serves that
purpose.
299. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U. S. 164, 172-73 (1989)
(“Considerations of stare decisis have special force in the area or statutory
interpretation, for here unlike in the context of constitutional interpretation, the
legislative power is implicated, and Congress remains free to alter what we have
done.”).
300. Republican Representative Meader thought Title VII an “ill-devised limitation
upon the area of discretion and decision-making of both American business and
American workers[,]” and for that reason among others opined that Title VII be deleted
from the Civil Rights Act. See H.R. REP. NO. 88-914, pt. 1, at 57-58 (1963). The
extreme conservatives paraded hot button issues like having to choose a “Negro”
despite personal preferences against “Negros,” and hiring by quota to achieve
numerical racial balance. They went on to predict a virtual social Armageddon: “If this
title of this legislation becomes a statute, we predict that it will be as bitterly resented
and equally as abortive as was the 18th Amendment [prohibition], and what it will do
to the political equilibrium, the social tranquility, and the economic stability of the
American society, no one can predict.” Id. at 111. “Now, I know that this so-called
civil rights legislation has a lot of political mileage in it. It is more or less the brain
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one Congressman, McDonnell Douglas assured that Title VII would
never be a teaching tool for equality where potentially serious and
frequent financial liability drove the lesson that disparate treatment had
consequences.
In a society where disparate treatment has never had consistent
and heavy repercussions for decision-makers,301 McDonnell Douglas’
representation of Title VII is evolutive in the sense of its relationship to
foundational links and its survivability under the dynamics of time.302
By 1973 Title VII had been on its temporal journey for nine years.
Presuming the existence of evolutive concerns, particularly current
policies, the McDonnell Douglas decision reflects that there were no
such concerns over the intervening period relating to disparate
treatment under Title VII.303 To the degree that evolutive concerns
attracted the Court’s attention in subsequent iterations of McDonnell
Douglas, those concerns favored employers and may be attributable to
a growing bias against employment discrimination claims.304 The
ultimate result of the evolution of disparate treatment under Title VII
was the formal statement that a claimant could prove discrimination,
but receive no relief if an employer would have made the same
decision for a reason detached from the claimant’s race, color, religion,
sex or national origin.305 As a demonstration that statutes are launched
across time to “live” as succeeding generations with changing concerns
give them contextually appropriate meaning through interpretation,
disparate treatment under Title VII looks like it never moved. That
does not mean that it is not “living.”
Title VII’s failure to evolve or move suggests that, as a nation,
there have been and are no material evolutive concerns about this form
of employment discrimination. The absence of such concerns over the
child of the Americans for Democratic Action, ADA, COPE, NAACP, and other
leftwing, radical groups. And they are whooping it up in the old corral. One of these
days some of the white folks may get tired of this sort of carrying on. One of these
days the white folks may decide they have taken enough. * * * These white folks may
decide they somebody to speak up for their rights—that is, what is left of their rights
after the politicians get through carving them up. Yes, there may yet be a day of
reckoning.” 110 CONG. REC. 2,568 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Fisher).
301. See generally Supreme Court Rhetoric, supra note 27.
302. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 71, at 358-59,n. 137.
303. Approaching 1973, the policy concerns had turned sharply against black rights
to be free from discrimination as Nixon sought to continue to capitalize on the whitebacklash. See SITKOFF, supra note 73, at 210-12.
304. See Supreme Court Rhetoric, supra note 27.
305. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
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quantity and quality of discrimination that Title VII tolerates indicates
that the tension set up between the cognition that Title VII prohibits all
racial discrimination and the presence of racial discrimination is not
sufficiently dissonant to cause action at the federal level. If the
cognition of a broadly remedial Title VII is true, the absence of
sufficient tension to cause action can be explained by the existence of a
new cognition about racial discrimination or that the existing cognition
has lost significance.306 A belief that racial discrimination is no longer a
problem in America and/or a bias against employment discrimination
claims307 would explain the lack of tension from any dissonance
because these cognitions replace the cognition of the existence of racial
discrimination or because, as additional cognitions they minimize the
significance of any racial discrimination.308
Since Congress has not amended Title VII to address concerns
with McDonnell Douglas, the cognition of, or belief in, Title VII as
intolerant of racial discrimination, “subtle or otherwise” is likely
false.309 The confirmation that the McDonnell Douglas Court’s view of
Title VII is legitimate, comes from Congress.310 There is little more to
ask of a decision in terms of confidence in its legitimacy if the one
body with the power to say the decision was wrong says nothing. In
this case, Congress has said nothing to indicate that McDonnell

306. See Supreme Court Rhetoric, supra note 27.
307. See id.
308. The Ash litigation suggests that the cognition of racial discrimination in
employment has lost value or has been replaced. The 11th Circuit’s initial conclusion,
that a white man has to say “black boy,” not just “boy,” to a black man in the middle of
Alabama describes a cognition that racial discrimination is not significant. From the
persistence of this cognition after the Supreme Court directed the 11th Circuit to
consider historical usage and context, one might conclude that the 11th Circuit’s
cognition does not admit the existence of racial discrimination in employment. The
Supreme Court’s failure to change this cognition suggests that the Court shares this
cognition or does not consider racial discrimination in employment as a significant
enough concern to justify its action. In other words, a white supervisor calling a black
subordinate “boy” in the middle of Alabama caused it no cognitive dissonance.
309. Cooksey, supra note 84, 419-20 (1966) (arguing that Title VII will only address
some of what he describes as “unreasonable discrimination” and concluding that “[t]he
role of law in the area of equal employment opportunity is a limited one.”).
310. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr v. Hicks, 509 U. S. 502, 542 (1993) (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (“It is not as though Congress is unaware of our decisions concerning Title
VII, and recent experience indicates that Congress is ready to act if we adopt
interpretations of [Title VII] it finds to be mistaken. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub.
L. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071. Congress has taken no action to indicate that we were
mistaken in McDonnell Douglas and Burdine.”).
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Douglas inaccurately, improperly or incorrectly implements the
mandate of Title VII for the protection of disparate treatment
claimants.311 In an era where there is a constant dialogue between the
Court and Congress over civil rights,312 Congress’ silence about
disparate treatment describes McDonnell Douglas’s legitimacy as the
congressionally sanctioned reading of Title VII.313

IV. GETTING WHAT WE NEED314
We need something Title VII, as interpreted by the Court and
approved by Congress, cannot give. We need an actual, as opposed to
311. Congress responded to the Court’s Price Waterhouse mixed motives decision in
the 1991 Civil Rights Act. The Court had described that the employer’s successful
establishment of a non-discriminatory motive as a complete defense to liability.
Congress officially adopted the Court’s formulation of mixed motives but rather than a
complete defense, Congress made a successful affirmative defense a bar to any
affirmative relief. In addition to the fact that this should have been the expected result
under a foundational reading of Section 706(g), the Congressional reaction cannot be
seen as a correction of an illegitimate result where the response prevented a party from
relying on the juridical fact of disparate treatment to obtain the only meaningful
benefits Title VII might give to an individual claimant: a job, a promotion, back-pay.
312. See Jack M. Beermann, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, Fifty
Years Later, 34 CONN. L. REV. 981, 1034 (2002) (Professor Beermann notes the
legitimacy issue, commenting that: “If you start from the premise that Congress’s
legislative power is a legitimate aspect of our system of government, then the best
evidence of the Court’s unjustifiable obstructionism is the frequency with which
Congress has found it necessary to legislatively overrule restrictive Supreme Court
decisions.”).
313. See Eugene Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50
MICH. L. REV. 1323, 1357 (1952) (tracing the impotency of Congress’ Reconstruction
era legislation to Congress’ failure to define its intentions in the text of the legislation
and concluding, in 1952, that the remnants of the civil rights program of the
Reconstruction era “are mute testimony to the power of the judiciary to render
impotent the expressed will of the people.”). See also Beermann, infra note 322, at
1034 (Noting the applicability of Professor Gressman’s criticisms of the “strict
constructionist” Court of the post-Reconstruction era to the Court’s treatment of civil
rights legislation in the fifty years between 1952 and 2002, concluding that: “By and
large, the Court has obstructed Congress and stood against efforts to legislatively
redistribute power from the advantaged to the disadvantaged.”). In the employment
discrimination area, the best demonstration of the dynamics Professors Gressman and
Beerman describe, is the Court’s chipping away at the Americans with Disabilities Act
of 1990 and Congress’ restoration of the Court’s damage to national policy regarding
the employment of the disabled in the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments
Act of 2009.
314. See generally THE ROLLING STONES, YOU CAN’T ALWAYS GET WHAT YOU
WANT (Decca Records 1969) (“You can’t always get what you want. But if you try
sometime, yeah, You just might find–you get what you need!”).
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rhetorical, purpose of eradicating employment discrimination, subtle or
otherwise. We need a living definition of discrimination that accounts
for actual human behavior including implicit bias.315 We need a method
of proof that eliminates the artificial and unhelpful distinction between
direct and circumstantial evidence so that disparate treatment is the
sole focus of fact finding.316
Obviously asking the Court to modify, change, improve or
overrule McDonnell Douglas is not a good option. In the 40 years since
McDonnell Douglas the Court’s refinements of its burden-shifting
analysis have made things worse for disparate treatment claimants.
Neither the Court nor Congress shows any signs of responsiveness to
criticism of the McDonnell Douglas problem. We needn’t resort only
to the Court or Congress. The remedy for the issue is at hand in the
Fair Employment Practices (“FEP”) laws of the individual states. It is
under state laws that those who desire the eradication of employment
discrimination have been able to craft the law to achieve the results
Title VII cannot attain. This is not to suggest that somehow, all state
FEP laws differ in some radical way from Title VII.317 They don’t.
What I am suggesting is that state FEP laws offers a more realistic
possibility of getting the results we need. There is likely an actual
intent or purpose to animate the state FEP which does not require an
act of Congress; which is what it would take to make Title VII what we
want it to be.
States follow federal precedent for reasons of convenience and/or
a fetish with symmetry. Under the right circumstances, it is easier to
315. Ivan E. Bodensteiner, The Implications Of Psychological Research Related To
Unconscious Discrimination And Implicit Bias In Proving Intentional Discrimination,
73 MO. L. REV. 83 (2008); Some Thoughts, supra note 16.
316. Tymkovich supra note 26.
317. Some states, notably Minnesota, have greater protections designed into their
FEP laws. See e.g. M.S.A. § 363A.03 Subd. 2 (protections against age discrimination
in employment cover people “over the age of majority.”) Montana is unique in having
effectively abolished at-will employment with its Wrongful Discharge from
Employment Act. M.C.A. § 39-2-904(1)(b) (a discharge is wrongful if “the discharge
was not for good cause . . .”). By statute an employee in Montana can only be
terminated for cause in addition to the fact that a Montana employer cannot
discriminate because of race, color, religion sex, national origin etc. M.C.A. § 49-2303(1)(a). It must be acknowledged that while a Montana claimant may file concurrent
claims under The Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act and the Montana Human
Rights Act and federal fair employment law, the wrongful discharge claim can be
superseded by a determination that the claimant has a cause of action under state for
federal antidiscrimination law. Tonack v. Montana Bank of Billings, 854 P.2d 326, 331
(Mont. 1993).
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urge a state supreme court to abandon federal precedent in favor of
state goals to eradicate employment discrimination than it is to ask the
Supreme Court to overrule itself. What state jurist would reject an
argument that the state’s courts should abandon federal precedent as a
measure of the rights of the state’s citizens against discrimination
where federal law’s only recommendation is its ability to check only
the most grotesque forms of discrimination and cases like Ash bring
even that capacity into question? Where the state’s FEP goals lack
necessary clarity, it is also an easier project, relative to seeking
Congressional action, to make state law conform to what we need via
state legislatures. Moreover, concerted efforts to achieve a critical mass
of states that reject McDonnell Douglas stands a better chance of
getting Congress’s attention.
The evidence of different results comes from California, Oregon,
Tennessee, and Missouri. California has rejected one of McDonnell
Douglas’ least defensible offshoots: the stray comments doctrine.318
Oregon opted out of the McDonnell Douglas fiction in 1986.319 The
Supreme Court of Tennessee abandoned McDonnell Douglas in
2010.320 Missouri dispensed with McDonnell Douglas in its entirety in
318. See Reid v. Google, Inc., 50 Cal. 4th 512, 536-46 (2010) I recognize that Price
Waterhouse bore “stray comments.” Price Waterhouse, however, would not exist
without McDonnell Douglas having created the distinction between direct and indirect
methods of proof in disparate treatment cases. Moreover, Justice O’Conner referenced
“stray comments” in connection with circumstantial evidence to distinguish them from
the stereotypical comments about Anne Hopkins that Price Waterhouse partners made
about her promotability that Justice O’Connor considered to be direct evidence of
discrimination.
319. See Callan v. Confederation of Or. Sch. Adm’rs., 717 P.2d 1252 (1986) ( “the
objective of finding the facts correctly is not advanced by the artifice of making a
chronological progression of evidentiary burdens the basis for deciding whether either
party is entitled to survive the other’s motion for summary judgment or a directed
verdict.”).
320. Gossett v. Tractor Supply Company, Inc., 320 S.W.3d 777 (Tenn. 2010)
superseded by statute TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-16-101 (2011); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-21311(e). The stated basis for the Gossett decision was not that Tennessee employment
discrimination law was different from Title VII, but that the McDonnell Douglas
burden shifting analysis was inconsistent with Tennessee’s civil procedure rules
governing summary judgment. Gossett, at 782 (“An employer therefore may meet its
burden of production pursuant to McDonnell Douglas without satisfying the burden of
production set forth in Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56.04 for a party moving for
summary judgment.”) The Gossett court, however, specifically noted that the usual
federal outcome, summary judgment for the employer based on the asserted legitimate
non-discriminatory reason, was problematic because “[a] legitimate reason for a
discharge . . . is not always mutually exclusive of a discriminatory or retaliatory motive
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2007.321 Missouri’s road to what we need arguably provides the best
result.
Missouri’s FEP law, the Missouri Human Rights Act (“MHRA”)
became state law in 1961.322 The MHRA defines “discrimination” in
employment as “any unfair treatment based on race, color, religion,
national origin, ancestry, sex, age as it relates to employment”323
Missouri courts had evaluated disparate treatment claims using
McDonnell Douglas since at least 1978.324 The Missouri Supreme
Court officially adopted McDonnell Douglas in 1984 because a
substantial number of other states had done so and because it “offers ‘a
sensible, orderly way to evaluate the evidence in light of common
experience as it bears on the critical question of discrimination.’”325 So,
despite the definition of “discrimination,” MHRA disparate treatment
claimants would remain as disadvantaged as any Title VII claimant for
twenty-three years.
In 2003, the first of two developments occurred that paved the
way for the Missouri Supreme Court to abandon McDonnell Douglas
in its 2007 Daugherty v. City of Maryland Heights326 decision. In 2003
the Missouri Supreme Court held that MHRA claimants had a right to a
jury trial in State ex rel. Diehl v. O’Malley.327 The second development
occurred in 2005, because the Diehl decision caused the adoption of a
and thus does not preclude the possibility that a discriminatory or retaliatory motive
played a role in the discharge decision.” Id. The Tennessee legislature swiftly
responded to Gossett. In 2011 the Tennessee legislature enacted a law to compel
Tennessee state courts to follow Tennessee federal court summary judgment rules.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-16-101. Simultaneously the Tennessee legislature codified the
McDonnell Douglas burden shifting analysis as part of the Tennessee Human Rights
Act. TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-21-311(e).
321. See Daugherty v. City of Md. Heights, 231 S.W.3d 814, (Mo. 2007).
322. MO. REV. STAT. §§ 213.010-137 (2000).
323. Id. § 213,010 (5) (emphasis added). Missouri does not keep legislative histories
so there is no way to know how the legislators at the time made the logical decision to
define “discrimination” or to use the “any unfair treatment” formulation. As the
MHRA preceded Title VII, however, the decision to define “discrimination” and the
definition cannot be seen as a response to Title VII.
324. See General Motors Corp. v. Fair Emp’t Practices Div., 574 S.W.2d 394, 397
(Mo. 1978).
325. Midstate Oil Co. v. Mo. Comm’n on Human Rights, 679 S.W.2d 842, 845 (Mo.
1984).
326. Daugherty, 231 S.W.3d at 814.
327. State ex rel. Diehl v. O’Malley, 95 S.W.3d 82, 92 (Mo. 2003). Note that
Congress had already given Title VII plaintiffs the right to a jury trial in the 1991 Civil
Rights Act.
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pattern jury instruction for MHRA cases.328 The Missouri Approved
Instruction (“MAI”) directs the jury to find for the plaintiff if the jury
believes that plaintiff’s race, for example, “was a contributing factor”
to the adverse employment action.329
The Daugherty court determined that MAI 31.24 called into question
the reliability of McDonnell Douglas in the summary judgment
analysis of claims under the MHRA.330 Without explicitly describing
McDonnell Douglas as a substantive hurdle for Title VII plaintiffs, the
Daugherty court held that: “Analyzing summary judgment decisions
under the standards set forth in MAI 31.24 [a contributing factor] is
appropriate because a plaintiff has no higher standard to survive
summary judgment than is required to submit a claim to a jury.”331
After Daugherty, Missouri courts have given meaning to the
standard rhetoric that summary judgment should seldom be used in
employment discrimination cases because they are so fact intensive
328. See Missouri Approved Jury Instructions (Civil) 31.24 (6th ed.). All Missouri
juries are instructed from the Missouri Approved Instructions (“MAI”). A deviation
from the MAI is grounds for reversal. Mo. Approved Jury Instructions (Civil) 70.02
(b), (c) (6th ed.).
329. Mo. Approved Jury Instructions (Civil) 31.24 (6th ed.).
330. Daugherty, 231 S.W.3d at, 819.
331. Id. at 820. The Daugherty court, of course recognized McDonnell Douglas for
what it is and continues to be a substantive, rather than procedural, aspect of the
Court’s interpretation of Title VII, which causes Title VII plaintiffs to have to prove
more at summary judgment than the same plaintiff would have to prove at trial.
McDonnell Douglas is such a powerful wolf in sheep’s clothing that, in states like
Oregon, defense counsel urge federal judges to evaluate state FEP claims under
McDonnell Douglas because it is merely a “procedural tool” and as a federal procedure
is properly employed under the Erie doctrine. See Snead v. Metropolitan Prop. & Cas.
Co., 237 F. 3d 1080, 1090 (9th Cir. 2001). See also Gacek v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 614 F.
3d 298 (7th Cir. 2010) (Posner, J., discussing applicability of McDonnell Douglas as a
procedural tool in an Illinois worker’s compensation wrongful discharge case and
concluding: “But when a retaliatory discharge case governed by Illinois law is litigated
in a federal court, the federal court must apply the standard of the state law to a motion
for summary judgment, and not the federal standard, because the standards are
materially different and the difference is rooted in a substantive policy of the state. We
are confirmed in this conclusion by the Supreme Court’s very recent decision in Gross
v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343 (2009). The question was whether the
rule of Price Waterhouse, shifting the burden of proving causation in Title VII cases
from plaintiff to defendant, should also govern cases under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act. The Supreme Court in Gross said no, thus treating the burdenshifting rule not as a substantively neutral rule of procedure but as a rule limited to a
particular statute, in that case Title VII. McDonnell Douglas has a broader domain of
applicability, at least as understood by the lower federal courts, but still a domain
defined by a substantive category, namely discrimination.”).
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and the outcomes depend on determinations of motive.332 Since
Daugherty there have been no reported successful summary judgments
by defendants under the MHRA in Missouri state courts.
In addition to making the plaintiff’s burden of proof a
“contributing factor”333 rather than a “motivating factor,”334 Missouri
gives its employment discrimination teeth by limiting questions of
“legitimate business reasons” to fact questions to be raised on summary
judgment or to be argued in front of a jury. Any employer may also
make the reason for an adverse employment decision an affirmative
defense.335 If a jury believes the affirmative defense the employer
avoids liability.336 Missouri law does not permit a mixed motives
defense.337
Some would argue that Missouri goes too far in eradicating
employment discrimination.338 It not only dispenses with all of the
problems of McDonnell Douglas, it effectively makes any adverse
personnel decision a viable claim for discrimination because a
“contributing factor” amounts to an extremely broad “any taint”
standard.339 If the goal is to eradicate all employment discrimination,
subtle or otherwise, an “any taint” standard is the best place to start.
Employers, at least in Missouri, find themselves learning that they
cannot avoid liability at summary judgment. The focus of the case
begins and ends with the question of discrimination rather than the
distraction of legitimate non-discriminatory business reasons, stray
comments, same actor inferences and other defenses which enable the
kind of disparate treatment we believed Title VII was meant to prevent.
332. “Summary judgment should seldom be used in employment discrimination
cases, because such cases are inherently fact-based and often depend on inferences
rather than on direct evidence. Summary judgment should not be granted unless
evidence could not support any reasonable inference for the non-movant.” Daugherty,
231 S.W.3d at 818.
333. Mo. Approved Jury Instructions (Civil) 31.24 (6th ed.).
334. See Eighth Circuit Manual of Model Civil Jury Instructions-Instruction 5.96
(2008).
335. Mo. Approved Jury Instructions (Civil) 31.25 (6th ed.).
336. Id.
337. In Missouri, the employer has only the option to argue that the employee did
not prove that a proscribed criterion was a “contributing factor” or to assert an
affirmative defense that the employee was fired for a legitimate business reason under
MAI 31.25.
338. See Kelly, Wiese, GOP looks to roll back Supreme Court decisions, MO.
LAWYERS WEEKLY, Sept. 20, 2010, at 1.
339. See discussion of the causation issue supra section II.B.3.e.
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Most important of all, under Missouri law you cannot both
discriminate on the basis of a proscribed characteristic and avoid
liability. The law acknowledges the existence of mixed motives, but,
unlike Title VII, none of them can be race, color, religion, national
origin or sex because the purpose of the MHRA is the eradication of
employment discrimination.
If eradicating employment discrimination, subtle or otherwise, is
the purpose and intent of the law, then a state would have to abandon
McDonnell Douglas at a minimum. When McDonnell Douglas is gone
there is no artificial distinction between circumstantial and direct
evidence and the fact finder immediately goes to the issue of
discrimination vel non. The door will be open for arguments based on
implicit bias. There will be no motivational inferences at all. Summary
judgment would become immediately anomalous in disparate treatment
cases because in McDonnell Douglas’ absence, courts would have to
respect the fact that motivations and intentions are credibility
determinations at heart which cannot be determined on the briefs. A
next step would be a definition for discrimination, if it does not already
exist. The definition need not go so far as “any unfair treatment.”
“Discrimination” could be defined as any adverse employment action
or differentiation in treatment not supported by objective factors such
as job qualifications or job performance.340 Finally, the point of
eradicating employment discrimination cannot be driven home in an
environment where an employer can avoid all financial liability by
claiming mixed-motives.341 To the degree that a state might tolerate
discriminatory animus being mitigated by other legitimate objective
and true reasons, fault should be apportioned.342 In that way, if there is
any discrimination, the discriminator is always financially responsible
for the harm caused to the victim of discrimination.

CONCLUSION
The Civil Rights Era was a golden opportunity to begin the actual
extirpation of discrimination as a social norm. Title VII could have
been a way to ultimately correct the actual shortcomings of a society
steeped in disparate treatment. It could have been engineered to make
340. See discussion of definitions of discrimination supra section II.B.3.e.i.
341. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989); Civil Right Act of
1991, Pub. L. No.102-166, 105 Stat. 1071.
342. It is standard practice under tort law to apportion fault and make those at fault
liable for proportional damages.
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its purpose the righting of a historical wrong by specifically
recognizing the continuing impact of segregation on the ability of its
intended beneficiaries and on the beliefs and behaviors of those who
benefitted the most from the status quo. Title VII could have stood for
the proposition that any discrimination was too much discrimination. If
workplace discrimination had a high price tag, soon enough,
discrimination would cease to make sense. The claim that it is
impossible to legislate belief is simply that—a claim. The validity of
the impossibility of legislating belief could have been tested. The will
to test the validity of the claim was absent; the window of opportunity
closed.
Instead, Title VII represents both a forgone opportunity and a
statement of moral infirmity. The right to be free from all but the most
obvious employment discrimination took a back seat to other demands
on the apparently finite resource of rights or interests. Congress and the
Court specifically identified some of these more valuable rights and
interests: A trial by judge or jury rather than a potentially interested
administrative body; the overarching interest in efficient and
trustworthy workmanship. Underlying these direct statements, one
senses recognition that granting Title VII rights endangered the rights
of the majority. Indeed, the cost of Title VII rights was so keenly
perceived that no amount of rhetoric could mask it. From that
recognition the majority took specific action to preserve its rights by
making Title VII relief profoundly unavailable. That fact does not
make Title VII structurally unsound. Nor does it make the Supreme
Court’s interpretations illegitimate. Title VII works.
In the absence of a Title VII that actually performs the function of
eradicating workplace discrimination hope lives yet. Congress and the
Supreme Court are not the only game in town. In the states it is
possible to avoid what we do not want and get what we need. Missouri,
for example, represents a world without McDonnell Douglas, where it
is safe to believe that the purpose of laws against employment
discrimination is the end of discrimination in employment. Admittedly,
seeking relief on this issue in the states is an iffy proposition. The
farther we move through time, the easier it becomes to believe that race
is not an issue, so why do anything? Those who want to believe that
race discrimination does not occur will adopt and adhere to that belief.
However, with the constancy of race based economic disparities, the
conclusion that America has moved beyond race cannot tolerate very
much scrutiny. The 1967 Commission on Civil Disorders concluded
that society is becoming separate and unequal. That society is separate
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and unequal is subject to empirical confirmation by walking across
campus or walking around a neighborhood.
No one can promise that pursuing a solution in the states will
uniformly produce instant results. After almost forty years of
McDonnell Douglas, anything is better than a Title VII that works.
And if over the course of the next forty years work in the states results
in any workplace discrimination leading to some unavoidable liability
on the part of the discriminator, the investment will have been well
worth the effort.
***

